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Tarang Shakti

Mission Pégase

VARUNA

AFSPA

Memory-Chip Crunch

Lottery Federalism

NFU Doctrine

UNGA-81

Compiled by *Sapna Chauhan*

Analysis · Value Addition · Prelims Pointers · Mains Practice

Tarang Shakti 2026: France Flies In for India's Biggest Air Exercise

WHY IN NEWS As part of **Mission Pégase 26**, the French Air and Space Force has landed four **Rafale F4** fighters, three **A330 MRTT Phénix** tanker-transporters and two **A400M Atlas** airlifters at Jodhpur for the **second edition of Tarang Shakti**, the multinational air exercise hosted by the Indian Air Force from **28 September to 12 October 2026**.

- ◆ **Scale and reach:** Seven foreign air forces field aircraft — the **US, France, Germany, Australia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the UAE** — while **32 countries attend as observers**, making Tarang Shakti India's premier platform for air-power diplomacy. The main venue is **Air Force Station Jodhpur**, Rajasthan, with adjoining bases.
- ◆ **A first — the F-35:** The US **F-35 Lightning II** exercises with the IAF for the first time, exposing Indian aircrew to fifth-generation stealth tactics, sensor fusion and networked air combat.
- ◆ **Mixed-fleet interoperability:** IAF Rafale, Su-30MKI, Mirage-2000, Jaguar, Tejas and MiG-29 fly alongside French Rafale F4s, UAE F-16s and transport fleets (Bangladesh's C-130J; Australian and German airlifters) — rehearsing large-force packages, air-to-air refuelling and humanitarian airlift.
- ◆ **Mission Pégase 26:** The **seventh edition** of France's long-range air-power projection (8 September–15 October) underlines France's view of itself as a **resident Indo-Pacific power** through Réunion, Mayotte, New Caledonia and French Polynesia.
- ◆ **Strategic signal:** Convening partners from the US and Europe to the Gulf and South Asian neighbours projects India as a **net security provider** and trusted convening power, while showcasing indigenous platforms such as the **Tejas** for defence exports.



French Rafales, A400Ms arrive for 'Tarang Shakti'

As part of Mission Pégase 26, the French Air and Space Force has deployed four Rafale F4 fighters, three A330 MRTT Phénix multi-role tanker transport aircraft, and two A400M Atlas aircraft to Jodhpur for the second edition of the multinational air exercise Tarang Shakti. The deployment arrived on Friday, and will participate in the Tarang Shakti air combat exercise hosted by the Air Force, from September 28 to October 12. The exercise is aimed at enhancing operational cooperation and interoperability between the participating air forces. Mission Pégase 26, the seventh edition of France's long-range air projection exercise, is being conducted from September 8 to October 15.

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VALUE ADDITION — AIR EXERCISE RADAR

Edition 1 (2024): Tarang Shakti debuted in two phases — Sullur (Tamil Nadu) and Jodhpur (Rajasthan).

IAF exercise calendar: Garuda (with France), Cope India (with US), Desert Knight (India–France–UAE); abroad, Red Flag is hosted by the US and Pitch Black by Australia (Darwin).

Aircraft decoded: Rafale F4 — latest standard of Dassault's omnirole fighter with upgraded connectivity and weapons; A330 MRTT — Airbus aerial refueller-cum-transport; A400M Atlas — four-engine turboprop military airlifter.

PRELIMS POINTERS ▶ Host: IAF · Venue: AFS Jodhpur ▶ 28 Sep – 12 Oct 2026
▶ 7 participants + 32 observers ▶ US F-35: debut with IAF ▶ Pégase 26 = 7th edition

SYLLABUS LINK · GS 2 — Bilateral, regional and global groupings affecting India's interests · GS 3 — Security forces and their mandate; defence modernisation.



TOPIC 02 · INDIA–FRANCE MARITIME TIES

The Hindu · Linked Story

Exercise VARUNA: INS Trishul Sails to Toulon for the 24th Edition

WHY IN NEWS Indian Navy guided-missile stealth frigate **INS Trishul** has arrived at the port of **Toulon, France**, to take part in the **24th edition of VARUNA**, the bilateral maritime exercise between the Indian Navy and the French Navy (*Marine Nationale*).

- ◆ **Foundational pillar:** VARUNA is the premier annual bilateral naval exercise between the two navies and the bedrock of the maritime leg of the **India–France Strategic Partnership (1998)**.
- ◆ **Lineage:** Bilateral naval interactions began in **1983**; the series was named **VARUNA in 2001**. It now covers **air defence, anti-submarine warfare and surface combat**, along with replenishment-at-sea and cross-deck flying.
- ◆ **Host and venue:** This edition is hosted by France at **Toulon Naval Base**, the principal base of the French Navy on the **Mediterranean** coast — extending the Indian Navy's operating familiarity from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean.
- ◆ **Air and sea in step:** With French Rafales in Jodhpur for Tarang Shakti and INS Trishul in Toulon, India–France defence ties are being exercised in two domains at once — a marker of a high-trust partnership.
- ◆ **Deeper convergence:** The 2018 Joint Strategic Vision for the Indian Ocean Region, the Reciprocal Logistics Support Agreement (2018), the **Horizon 2047** roadmap (2023) and industrial ties (Scorpène-class submarines, Rafale-M for INS Vikrant) give VARUNA real strategic depth.



Photo: Exercise VARUNA

VALUE ADDITION — INDIA–FRANCE EXERCISE TRIO

Shakti — Army · **Garuda** — Air Force · **VARUNA** — Navy. (Named after the Vedic deity of waters.)

INS Trishul: Talwar-class guided-missile stealth frigate, built in Russia and commissioned in 2003.

France in the Indo-Pacific: Réunion and Mayotte (Indian Ocean), New Caledonia and French Polynesia (Pacific) — hence France's 'resident power' claim.

PRELIMS POINTERS ▶ 24th edition ▶ Host: France · Toulon ▶ INS Trishul (Talwar-class)

▶ Named VARUNA in 2001 ▶ Interactions since 1983

SYLLABUS LINK · GS 2 — India and its neighbourhood/extended neighbourhood; bilateral agreements involving India.

**TOPIC 03 · INTERNAL SECURITY**

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AFSPA Extended in Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal for Six More Months

WHY IN NEWS The Union Home Ministry has extended the **Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958** for another six months in **Manipur** (whole State except 13 police stations in five valley districts), in nine districts and 21 police stations of five other districts of **Nagaland**, and in three districts plus three police stations of a district bordering Assam in **Arunachal Pradesh**.

- ◆ **Manipur's widened footprint:** Nearly the whole State stays "disturbed" amid the lingering fallout of **ethnic violence since 3 May 2023**. On 14 November 2024 the Act had been reimposed in six police stations in five districts; **President's Rule**, imposed on 13 February 2025, was revoked on 4 February 2026.

VALUE ADDITION — AFSPA: ORIGIN, SECTIONS, SCRUTINY

Origins: Colonial Armed Forces Special Powers Ordinance (1942) to crush the Quit India Movement → AFSPA passed in **1958** for the Naga insurgency (Naga Hills then part of Assam) → **1972 amendment** let the Centre declare any area "disturbed" without State consent; the Act then spread to Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh.

Section 3 — declaration of disturbed area by the Governor, UT Administrator or Central Government through the Official Gazette. **Section 4** — special powers: use of force, arrest and search without warrant, prohibition of assembly of five or more. **Section 6** — immunity: no prosecution without Central sanction.

Judicial check: *Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. UoI* (1997) upheld the Act but asked for periodic review of notifications; *EEVFAM v. UoI* (2016) held there is no absolute immunity — excessive force even in disturbed areas must be probed.

Committees: Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy Committee (2005) and the 2nd ARC recommended repealing AFSPA and folding its essentials into the UAPA. Withdrawn from Tripura (2015) and Meghalaya (2018); J&K has a separate AFSPA of 1990.

- ◆ **Gains that reversed:** AFSPA was withdrawn from the **Imphal municipal area in 2004** and from all valley police stations between April 2022 and April 2023 amid an improved security situation — its return shows how fragile normalcy can be.
- ◆ **Nagaland and Arunachal:** Nine districts plus 21 police stations remain notified in Nagaland; in Arunachal, three districts (Tirap, Changlang, Longding) and police stations in a district along the Assam border (Namsai) remain “disturbed”.
- ◆ **Sweeping powers:** In disturbed areas the Army and CAPFs may use force — even causing death — against those acting in contravention of law, arrest and search without warrant, and enjoy protection from prosecution without the Union government’s sanction.
- ◆ **Case for:** Active insurgent groups, a porous Myanmar border feeding arms and drugs, ethnic polarisation in Manipur, and the need for legal cover to troops operating in aid of civil power.
- ◆ **Case against:** Allegations of excesses (e.g. the Oting firing, Mon district, Nagaland, December 2021), an alienation-militancy cycle, and weak accountability since prosecution sanction is rarely granted.
- ◆ **Way forward:** Periodic, evidence-based review of each notification; time-bound decisions on sanction; strict adherence to Supreme Court guidelines; building State police capacity so the Army can exit; and sustained political dialogue — Naga peace talks and Kuki-Meitei reconciliation.

AFSPA extended in parts of Arunachal, Manipur, Nagaland

The Hindu Bureau
NEW DELHI

The Union Home Ministry on Friday extended the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) in parts of Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, and Nagaland for another six months.

The AFSPA has been extended in the whole State of Manipur except the jurisdiction of 13 police stations in five valley districts, a notification said. Manipur has been affected by ethnic violence since May 3, 2023.

On November 14, 2024, out of 19 police stations in seven districts of Manipur, the Act was reimposed in the limits of six police stations in five districts, mostly in the valley, in the wake of the 2023 ethnic violence. President’s Rule was imposed in the State on February 13, 2025 and revoked on February 4 this year.

The AFSPA was withdrawn from all valley police stations between April 1, 2022 and April 1, 2023 by the Manipur government

amid an improved security situation and a “large sense of security among general public”. The provisions of the Act were withdrawn from the Imphal municipality area in 2004.

In Nagaland, the Act was extended for another six months in nine districts, and 21 police stations in five other districts, another notification said.

In Arunachal Pradesh, three districts and as many police stations in another district bordering Assam, were declared “disturbed area” for another six months.

Sweeping powers

The 1958 law gives power to the Army and the Central Armed Police Forces deployed in “disturbed areas” to kill anyone acting in contravention of law; arrest and search any premises without a warrant; and protection from prosecution and legal suits without the Union government’s sanction. The Act has been applicable in Manipur since 1981. Manipur, a former Union Territory, attained Statehood in 1972.

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Border Connect: The Centre decided in 2024 to scrap the **Free Movement Regime** along the 1,643-km India-Myanmar border and fence it fully — a key context for Manipur’s security. **Mains keywords:** ‘aid to civil power’, calibrated de-notification, accountability deficit, trust-deficit in the hills and valley.

PRELIMS POINTERS ▶ AFSPA in Manipur since 1981 ▶ Manipur Statehood: 1972

- ▶ Imphal municipality exempted 2004 ▶ Irom Sharmila’s fast: 2000–2016
- ▶ Notification period: 6 months

SYLLABUS LINK · GS 2 — Statutory laws, Centre-State relations, rights issues · GS 3 — Security challenges and their management in border areas.

AI's Hunger for Memory Chips Is Pricing Out India's Budget Phone Buyer

WHY IN NEWS Smartphone prices in India have risen in successive tranches since February — the latest round adding ₹1,000–₹5,000 per handset — as AI companies and data centres soak up the world's supply of **memory chips**. Retailers report that footfall is no longer turning into sales.

- ◆ **Root cause:** Chipmakers are diverting capacity to **high-bandwidth memory (HBM)** and server DRAM for AI accelerators, which earn far higher margins — squeezing supply of the mobile DRAM and NAND flash that phones need.
- ◆ **Budget segment hit hardest:** “People ask me for ₹10,000 phones, but there is no such thing any more,” says a Delhi retailer — some budget models have **more than doubled**. Notifications from Vivo, Samsung, Realme, Oppo, Nothing, Poco and Xiaomi were obtained via the All India Mobile Retailers Association (AIMRA).
- ◆ **How buyers are adjusting:** AIMRA estimates ~60% of demand still converts; ~20% settle for less powerful or second-hand phones; another ~20% wait for festive discounts or a rumoured **GST cut** (GST on smartphones: **18%**).
- ◆ **Winners and losers:** Retailers holding stock bought at old dealer prices enjoy fatter margins (3.85% to over 14% on some Samsung models) and trade-in phones fetch better prices; first-time and rural buyers lose most.
- ◆ **Global and durable:** Counterpoint Research forecasts global **sub-\$200 smartphone shipments to fall ~40% between 2025 and 2030**; the trade expects hikes to continue possibly till 2028–2030 — “more like a plane than a rocket” next year.
- ◆ **Why it matters:** The affordable smartphone is India's on-ramp to UPI, DBT, DigiLocker, e-learning and telemedicine; costlier devices risk widening the **digital divide**.
- ◆ **Policy levers:** Rationalising GST on entry-level devices, device-financing for first-time users, quality standards for refurbished phones with robust e-waste rules, and faster domestic memory/ATMP capacity under the India Semiconductor Mission.

AI-led phone price hikes persist, hitting Indian customers


A series of price hikes has put budget phones out of reach for many who choose to wait for festival discounts or settle for 'less-powerful' devices

Aroon Deep
NEW DELHI

As smartphone prices increase due to a spike in demand for memory chips by AI companies and data centres, phone retailers have seen customer base dry up in a significant way. “This is the first time I'm seeing phone prices increase, and continue increasing relentlessly, in the last 20 years,” said Vivek Singh, 42, a phone retailer in south Delhi, who has been in the business for decades. “I have 10 or 15 people coming into the shop each day, and only one or two buy a phone,” he said. Since February, phone makers have been sending retailers price hike notifications that have been progressively growing.

The *Hindu* obtained such notifications from Vivo, Samsung, Realme, Oppo, Nothing, Poco, and Xiaomi from the All India Mobile Retailers Association (AIMRA). Price hikes have ranged from ₹1,000 to ₹5,000, but that is only the latest tranche. “People ask me for ₹10,000 phones, but there is no such thing any more,” Mr. Singh rued, noting that some budget handsets' prices have more than doubled.

The results of these



Pocket unfriendly: Price hikes have ranged from ₹1,000 to ₹5,000, but that is only the latest tranche. AFP

hikes have not been completely doom and gloom just yet, at least not yet.

Kailash Lakhyani, AIMRA's founder chairman, told *The Hindu* that retailers were beginning to see better prices for pre-owned phones they got during trade-in purchases, and that retailers who had already purchased stock at an old dealer price were benefiting from a higher margin at newer prices.

A review of price hike notifications showed that some retailers saw their margins jump from 3.85% to over 14% for some Samsung phones. “60% of phones are being purchased overall,” Mr. Lakhyani claimed. “20% of customers are settling for less powerful phones, or buying second hand, and the 20% of customers below that are waiting for the festival season hoping for

discounts,” he added. “There's also a rumour of a GST cut for smartphones, so some customers are waiting for that,” he said. The GST for smartphones stands at 18%. But this situation may worsen. “We have been in touch with phone companies, and they say this situation may go on till 2028 or even 2030,” Mr. Lakhyani said. “Next year also there will be hikes, but it may be more like a plane rather than a rocket [like this year was],” he added.

The phenomenon is global, as the memory chip crunch created by AI demand has hit electronics supply chains across the board. “Global sub-\$200 smartphone shipments are forecast to fall ~40% between 2025 and 2030,” Counterpoint Research, a smartphone sales analyst firm, said on Thursday.

VALUE ADDITION — MEMORY CHIPS DECODED

DRAM — volatile working memory; **NAND flash** — non-volatile storage; **HBM** — DRAM dies stacked vertically beside a GPU for massive bandwidth, today's key bottleneck in AI hardware.

Concentrated market: Samsung, SK Hynix and Micron dominate DRAM, so their capacity choices ripple across every device supply chain.

India's chip push: India Semiconductor Mission (2021; ₹76,000 crore outlay) — Micron's ATMP unit at Sanand, Gujarat; PLI for large-scale electronics (2020) made India the world's second-largest mobile-phone manufacturer.

PRELIMS POINTERS ▶ GST on phones: 18% (from 12% in 2020)

▶ AIMRA = All India Mobile Retailers Assn. ▶ HBM = High Bandwidth Memory

▶ Sub-\$200 shipments: ~40% fall by 2030

SYLLABUS LINK · GS 3 — Indian economy and inflation; industrial policy; developments in science and technology · GS 2 — Digital inclusion and welfare delivery.



TOPIC 05 · EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The Hindu · Page 6 · Op-Ed

Regulate, Don't Prohibit: The Case for Accountable Lotteries

WHY IN NEWS An op-ed by K. Ashok Vardhan Shetty argues that India's prohibition-heavy approach to lotteries pushes players towards illegal *matka*, *satta* and offshore portals, and proposes **two amendments to the Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998** to enable transparent, State-run lotteries.

- ◆ **The vice paradox:** Lotteries disproportionately burden poorer households; rapid draws, instant games, credit sales, opaque odds and manipulative advertising fuel compulsive play — strong arguments for **stringent regulation, not necessarily prohibition**.
- ◆ **Prohibition backfires:** As US Prohibition (18th Amendment and Volstead Act, 1920–33, repealed by the 21st Amendment) showed, bans leave demand intact. Illegal operators use cash agents and mule accounts — no audits, age checks, secure prize funds or fraud remedies — while States lose surpluses and GST and poor or disabled vendors lose livelihoods.
- ◆ **The global norm:** Lotteries are legal in nearly four-fifths of countries; nearly 70% of jurisdictions follow a **public-operator model**. Federations — the US (45 States and DC), Canada, Australia, Germany — allow voluntary cross-border pooling, e.g. Powerball and Lotto 6/49.
- ◆ **India today:** A Lok Sabha reply (14 March 2023) listed only **nine lottery States** — Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Kerala (Keralam), Maharashtra, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Sikkim and West Bengal.
- ◆ **The legal knot:** In *B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P.* (1999) the Supreme Court read down Section 5 — a State may exclude other States' lotteries only by abandoning its own. Facing this all-or-nothing choice, **Tamil Nadu (2003) and Karnataka (2007)** chose total prohibition.

- ◆ **Amendment 1 — Section 5:** Allow a State to bar outside lotteries “whether or not” it runs its own, with destination-State consent decisive but applied uniformly (admit all or exclude all).

The case for accountable lottery regulation in India

Urged to ban tobacco, Napoleon III, Emperor of France (1852-70), replied, “This vice brings in one hundred million francs in taxes every year. I will certainly forbid it at once – as soon as you can name a virtue that brings in as much revenue.” His uncle, Napoleon Bonaparte, is also credited with calling vices “very good patriots” (though the attribution is uncertain), while Ralph Waldo Emerson observed that “tobacco could cheerfully carry the load of armies”. Different voices, one hard-headed insight: vices are fiscally invaluable.

Yet, every age has moral crusaders whose puritanical zeal to ban tobacco, alcohol, or lotteries rests on the misconception – and conceit – that the state can extinguish persistent demand simply by declaring an activity unlawful. Pragmatists know better: a prohibition may be morally appealing yet administratively futile – or, worse, positively counterproductive.

The United States learnt this lesson the hard way. Following a sustained temperance campaign, it imposed prohibition through the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act, from 1920 to 1933. While suppressing legal supply, prohibition left demand intact, fuelling a lucrative black market controlled by violent syndicates such as Al Capone’s. Bootlegging corrupted public institutions, deprived governments of excise revenue and imposed heavy enforcement costs. The Twenty-First Amendment repealed prohibition, recognising that a regulated and taxed market could cause fewer harms than an unenforceable ban. States in India that have experimented with prohibition have faced similar challenges.

The argument for regulation

Lotteries are undoubtedly a vice, though arguably less pernicious than tobacco or alcohol. They disproportionately burden poorer households, encouraging them to stake scarce income on remote chances of reward. Rapid draws and instant games can encourage compulsive play and loss-chasing, while giant jackpots distort risk perception. Credit sales, opaque odds and manipulative advertising compound these harms. These are powerful arguments for stringent regulation, not necessarily prohibition.

Lottery bans can push players towards smuggled tickets, *matka*, *satta*, single-digit rackets and offshore portals. Operating through cash agents and mule accounts, these enterprises lack audits and age restrictions, secure prize funds and effective remedies against fraud. Governments lose lottery surpluses and GST revenue, while legitimate vendors, many of them poor or disabled, lose livelihoods and enforcement costs rise. In seeking to protect the vulnerable, the state may instead leave them at the mercy of unaccountable operators.



K. Ashok Vardhan Shetty

Retired IAS officer, a former Vice-Chancellor of the Indian Maritime University, Chennai, and Member, The Justice Kurian Joseph Committee on Union-State Relations

The state’s paternalism is not class-neutral. Affluent citizens can day-trade, use leveraged derivatives or speculate in crypto-assets despite the risk of ruinous losses. Securities trading involves skill and derivatives facilitate hedging and price discovery. Yet, the state does not test competence before admitting retail traders to these markets. The Securities and Exchange Board of India found that the vast majority of day traders and futures-and-options traders incurred losses. Financial markets are legal not because everyone acts wisely, but because risks are disclosed, intermediaries regulated and fraud punished, while adult choice is preserved. Lotteries can follow the same principle, with more stringent safeguards appropriate to games of chance.

The international norm

Lotteries are legal in nearly four-fifths of countries. Blanket prohibition survives mainly in countries enforcing strict Sharia-based gambling prohibitions, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Brunei, and in closed ideological regimes such as Cuba.

Across diverse political and economic systems, the norm is controlled legality, with lottery surpluses allocated transparently to education, health care, sports, welfare or infrastructure. Nearly 70% of lottery jurisdictions follow the public-operator model, in which a government body, statutory authority or State-owned company runs the lottery while private firms provide retail and technology services. Under the concession model, the State regulates the lottery but grants operating rights to a private concessionaire.

Federal countries generally entrust lotteries to their constituent units while permitting voluntary cooperation across borders. Lotteries operate in 45 of the 50 U.S. States and Washington DC; all 10 Canadian provinces and three territories; all six Australian States and both mainland territories; and all 16 German Länder. Authorisation in one jurisdiction does not confer the right to sell in another. Cross-border sales require the destination jurisdiction’s consent or participation in a cooperative arrangement. The U.S.’s Powerball, Canada’s Lotto 6/49, Australian lottery blocs and Germany’s DLTB allow participating jurisdictions to pool players and prizes while retaining regulatory autonomy.

A Lok Sabha reply of March 14, 2023, identified only nine States operating lotteries: Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Kerala, Maharashtra, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Sikkim and West Bengal. Amid persistent State fiscal stress, the widespread preference for prohibition deserves reconsideration. Government-organised lotteries fall under Entry 40 of the Union List. The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998, permits States to organise lotteries subject to Section 4 conditions,

while Sections 5 and 6 empower States and the Union Government, respectively, to prohibit lotteries that violate Sections 4 and 5.

Two necessary amendments

Settled Supreme Court jurisprudence treats gambling, including State-organised lotteries, as *res extra commercium*, outside the protections of Articles 19(1)(g) – fundamental right to trade – and 301 – freedom of trade across India. Section 5 of the Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998, reflects this principle by allowing States to prohibit outside lotteries. A parallel doctrine applies to potable alcohol, allowing States to restrict or prohibit out-of-State consignments.

Yet, in *B.R. Enterprises vs State of U.P.* (1999), the Court read Section 5 down: a State may exclude other States’ lotteries only by abandoning its own and becoming wholly lottery-free.

This all-or-nothing rule is difficult to justify. While a State directly oversees its own lottery administration, its oversight of another State’s operations within its territory is necessarily indirect, even as it bears the local enforcement burden. This disparity in regulatory control underpins the case for excluding other States’ lotteries. Faced with this revenue-regulation trade-off, Tamil Nadu (2003) and Karnataka (2007) chose total prohibition, thereby forfeiting the option of running accountable public lotteries of their own.

Parliament should amend Section 5 to clarify that the provision applies “whether or not the prohibiting State organises a lottery of its own”. Destination-State consent should be decisive, subject to uniform treatment: a State must either admit all outside lotteries or exclude them all.

Smaller States, especially in the northeast, may fear exclusion from larger markets, but compulsory access is no remedy. A new Section 4A should authorise two or more States to establish a common lottery by agreement, pooling players, prizes, technology and costs, as in successful multi-State lotteries elsewhere.

Transparent regulation offers a more accountable alternative to prohibition. Section 4 permits States to sell tickets directly or through distributors or agents. While marketing agents may provide guaranteed revenue, departmental operation can be more transparent and enable retail distribution through small vendors, persons with disabilities, women’s self-help groups and cooperatives, broadening livelihood opportunities and limiting intermediary capture.

Kerala follows this model. In FY 2023-24, it earned ₹2,883.80 crore – ₹1,129.71 crore in net lottery revenue (or surplus) and ₹1,754.09 crore in State GST. It channels lottery surpluses into health care and welfare. Kerala’s public-operator model offers a useful, though not exclusive, template for reform.

Regulation, not prohibition, can curb lottery harms while preserving accountability

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- ◆ **Amendment 2 — new Section 4A:** Let two or more States run a **common lottery** by agreement, pooling players, prizes, technology and costs – a lifeline for smaller north-eastern States.
- ◆ **The Kerala template:** Departmental operation with retail through small vendors, persons with disabilities, women’s SHGs and cooperatives. In FY 2023-24 it earned **₹2,883.80 crore** – ₹1,129.71 crore net lottery surplus plus ₹1,754.09 crore State GST – channelled into health care and welfare.

VALUE ADDITION — THE CONSTITUTIONAL MAP OF LOTTERIES

Union List, Entry 40: Lotteries organised by the Government of India or a State Government. **State List, Entry 34:** Betting and gambling. **State List, Entry 62:** Taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling.

Res extra commercium: Since *State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala* (1957), gambling is not “trade”, so Articles 19(1)(g) and 301 do not protect it – a doctrine also applied to potable liquor.

Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998: Section 4 — conditions for State lotteries (e.g. no single-digit lottery, limited draws); Section 5 — States may prohibit other States' lotteries; Section 6 — Centre may prohibit lotteries violating Sections 4 and 5.

Related: *Skill Lotto Solutions v. UoI* (2020) upheld GST on lotteries; the Promotion and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2025 bans online money games.

HP Connect: Himachal Pradesh, which discontinued its State lottery around 1999, decided in 2025 to revive it to shore up revenue — a live example of the regulation-versus-prohibition trade-off discussed in this op-ed.

PRELIMS POINTERS ▶ Kerala State Lottery (1967): India's oldest ▶ Only 9 lottery States (2023)
▶ Entry 40, List I ▶ B.R. Enterprises (1999)

SYLLABUS LINK · GS 2 — Federal structure, distribution of legislative powers, statutory law · GS 3 — Mobilisation of resources; State finances.



TOPIC 06 · EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

The Hindu · Page 8 · Op-Ed

Review, Not Revision: Rethinking India's Nuclear Doctrine

WHY IN NEWS An op-ed by Advitya Madan argues that India's **2003 nuclear doctrine** — credible minimum deterrence and No First Use — should be **reviewed, not rewritten**, as China–Pakistan alignment, disruptive technologies and multipolar rivalry reshape the security environment.

- ◆ **Origins: Pokhran-II (1998)** established India as a nuclear weapons state; **Kargil (1999)** showed nuclear deterrence does not rule out conventional war. The **1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine** and the **CCS decision of 4 January 2003** reconciled deterrence with restraint.
- ◆ **Core pillars (2003):** Credible minimum deterrence; **No First Use**; retaliation to a nuclear attack to be **massive** and cause unacceptable damage; survivable second-strike capability; firm civilian control; and the option of nuclear retaliation against a **major biological or chemical attack**.
- ◆ **Shift 1 — collusive threat:** China has expanded and modernised its forces, built up infrastructure along the LAC and deepened defence ties with Pakistan, which has added tactical nuclear weapons. India must plan for two closely aligned nuclear adversaries interacting in one crisis.
- ◆ **Shift 2 — technology:** AI, cyber tools, space-based surveillance, hypersonic weapons and ballistic missile defence shorten decision time, expose command-and-control networks and complicate assumptions about assured retaliation.
- ◆ **Shift 3 — geopolitics:** US–China rivalry, closer China–Russia coordination and India's widening partnerships make deterrence an Indo-Pacific, multi-actor problem rather than a bilateral one.
- ◆ **The massive-retaliation question:** Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons aim to complicate India's responses below the strategic threshold; a review could test whether the declaratory posture gives enough deterrent clarity — without changing core principles.

Revisiting India's nuclear doctrine without revising it

India's nuclear doctrine has remained largely unchanged for over two decades, even as its security environment has shifted dramatically. Since its operationalisation in 2003, China's military rise has accelerated, Pakistan's nuclear posture has evolved, disruptive technologies have reshaped deterrence, and geopolitical competition has become more multipolar. Yet, the doctrine's core principles – credible minimum deterrence and a declared No First Use (NFU) posture – have endured, albeit with a specific provision retaining the option of nuclear retaliation following a major biological chemical attack on India or Indian forces. The question is whether a framework crafted for the early 2000s remains fully aligned with the security challenges of the mid-2020s.

A doctrine for another era, strategic shifts India's nuclear doctrine emerged from the distinct strategic context of the late 1990s. The 1998 Pokhran-II tests established India as a nuclear weapons state, while Kargil (1999) showed that nuclear deterrence did not rule out conventional war. The 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine and the Cabinet Committee on Security's January 4, 2003 decision sought to reconcile deterrence with restraint. The 2003 decision operationalised a posture based on credible minimum deterrence, No First Use (NFU) and massive retaliation to a nuclear attack, supported by a survivable second-strike capability and firm civilian control. Judged by its original objectives, the doctrine has provided continuity, predictability and strategic stability for more than two decades. The question is whether the assumptions underpinning it remain stable.

The strategic environment underpinning the framework has changed in three important ways. First, China and Pakistan have grown more strategically aligned. When the doctrine was



Advitya Madan
Analyst on geopolitics, international and defence affairs, commanded 15 Punjab in Lebanon under the United Nations Flag, commanded 27 Sector as DIO in Churachandpur, Manipur, and was Brigadier Operational Logistics in HQ Western Command

India's nuclear doctrine faces new strategic, technological and geopolitical challenges

formulated, the two nuclear-armed neighbours posed distinct challenges; today, those challenges are increasingly interconnected. China has expanded and modernised its nuclear forces, strengthened military infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control and deepened defence cooperation with Pakistan. Pakistan has diversified its nuclear capabilities, including tactical nuclear weapons intended to offset India's conventional advantage. India must therefore account for the possibility that pressures from two closely aligned nuclear adversaries could interact during a crisis.

The second shift is technological. Artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, space-based surveillance, hypersonic weapons and ballistic missile defence are reshaping deterrence by shortening decision-making timelines, increasing the vulnerability of command-and-control networks and complicating assumptions about assured retaliation. These technologies do not invalidate the doctrine's core principles, but they alter the environment in which they must operate. Nuclear deterrence ultimately depends on the alignment of doctrine, capability and survivability.

The third shift is geopolitical. The Indo-Pacific has become a key arena of great-power competition, while the international system has grown more multipolar. U.S.-China rivalry, closer China-Russia coordination and India's expanding partnerships have reshaped the security environment. Nuclear doctrine can no longer be viewed solely through bilateral deterrence; regional crises are increasingly shaped by wider geopolitical competition.

Review, not revision

Strategic doctrines are policy instruments, not immutable documents. In India's case, a review could examine emerging technologies, command-and-control resilience, second-strike

capabilities and the continuing relevance of existing concepts, including the doctrine's approach to retaliation.

The issue of massive retaliation deserves scrutiny. Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons were intended to complicate India's response options below the level of strategic exchange. A review could assess whether India's declaratory posture provides sufficient deterrent clarity across nuclear contingencies, without necessarily changing its core principles.

There are, however, reasons for caution. India's doctrine has reinforced its image as a restrained and responsible nuclear power while providing continuity in deterrence. Ambiguity over established principles, particularly NFU, could create uncertainty, encourage adversaries to recalibrate and complicate crisis management. The priority, therefore, should be to strengthen operational capabilities, modernise delivery systems and improve command-and-control resilience rather than reopen declaratory policy.

A review of NFU need not mean abandoning it. It could reaffirm its rationale, clarify its scope and ensure that supporting capabilities remain credible. Reviewing a doctrine is not the same as revising it.

Building credible capabilities

For India, any doctrinal review should also assess survivability, command and control, intelligence, early warning, cyber resilience and the nuclear triad. The aim should be to ensure that India's declared policy remains backed by credible capabilities in a changing strategic environment, while aligning nuclear policy with its broader diplomatic objectives and strategic autonomy.

Ultimately, a nuclear doctrine is an instrument of statecraft, not an immutable policy. India's commitment to restraint, credible deterrence and responsible nuclear stewardship remains an enduring strategic asset.

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- ◆ **Reasons for caution:** NFU has built India's image as a restrained, responsible power. Ambiguity could encourage adversaries to recalibrate and complicate crisis management – so the priority is stronger capabilities, not reopening declaratory policy.
- ◆ **Building credible capabilities:** Any review should assess survivability, command and control, intelligence, early warning, cyber resilience and the nuclear triad – keeping declared policy backed by credible capability and aligned with strategic autonomy.

VALUE ADDITION — NUCLEAR ARCHITECTURE AT A GLANCE

Nuclear Command Authority: Political Council chaired by the **Prime Minister** (sole authority to order nuclear use); Executive Council chaired by the **National Security Adviser**; the **Strategic Forces Command** (2003) manages the arsenal.

Triad: Land — Agni series; Air — Mirage-2000, Jaguar, Rafale; Sea — Arihant-class SSBNs with K-series SLBMs (INS Arihant's first deterrence patrol in 2018 completed the triad).

Non-proliferation profile: Not a party to the NPT or CTBT; member of the MTCR (2016), Wassenaar Arrangement (2017) and Australia Group (2018); NSG membership pending despite the 2008 NSG waiver.

Doctrine drafting: The 1999 draft was prepared by the National Security Advisory Board under K. Subrahmanyam; the 2003 doctrine also pledges no use against non-nuclear weapon states.

PRELIMS POINTERS ▶ Pokhran-I: 1974 (Smiling Buddha) ▶ Pokhran-II: May 1998 (Operation Shakti)
▶ China: NFU since 1964 ▶ Pakistan: no NFU; 'Full Spectrum Deterrence'

SYLLABUS LINK · GS 3 — Security challenges; linkages of security with technology · GS 2 — Effect of policies of developed and neighbouring countries on India.

TOPIC 07 · EDITORIAL ANALYSIS

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Overweight and Weak: The UN at 81 Must Move Beyond Superpower Hegemony

WHY IN NEWS The **81st session of the UN General Assembly** — António Guterres's last as Secretary-General — was marked more by rancour than by solutions, prompting calls to reform a UN that at 81 looks **overweight, weak and unrepresentative**.

- ◆ **A year of urgency:** Guterres's tenure saw a record number of crises — conflicts, a pandemic, climate disasters and the advent of a dangerous age of AI. One study recorded **65+ conflicts across 35 countries in 2025**, the highest since 1946.
- ◆ **Why the UN is weakened:** Polarisation on every major issue, wars by global powers in violation of the UN Charter, nuclear threats and the imposition of **unilateral and illegitimate sanctions**.
- ◆ **A summit without solutions:** Leaders at the heart of the conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza and the Persian Gulf offered no road map. The US President spoke of the possible “annihilation” of Iran, defended US actions in Venezuela and again claimed to have negotiated peace in the 2025 India–Pakistan four-day conflict; Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian called the US and Israel “murderers, terrorists and assassins”; the Russian President skipped the session; and the US denied visas to the Palestinian delegation.
- ◆ **Partnership for Multilateralism (P4M):** An EU-led initiative, co-sponsored by India, to build multilateralism beyond superpower hegemony — well-meaning, but drowned out by the rancour.
- ◆ **South Asia's moment:** Bangladesh's Foreign Minister **Khalilur Rahman** presides over the 81st UNGA and will oversee the selection of the next Secretary-General.
- ◆ **India's paradox:** India has launched a campaign for a **UNSC non-permanent seat for 2028-29**, yet the Prime Minister skipped the UNGA speech and side-line summits, fresh from hosting the **Delhi BRICS Summit**. India's voice as a balancing power for a rules-based order is needed more than ever.

Overweight and weak

The UN is unwieldy, and needs to move away from superpower hegemony

The 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) could have been written off as just another year, with another set of speeches delivered on the global multilateral stage. However, this year, the UN's annual Summit has a unique sense of urgency. This is UN Secretary-General (UNSG) António Guterres's final session, after a tenure marked by a record number of global crises, conflicts, pandemics, climate disasters and the advent of a dangerous age of Artificial Intelligence. Not since the Second World War have there been so many conflicts; one study recorded more than 65 conflicts across 35 countries in 2025, the highest since 1946. Growing polarisation on every major issue, wars by global superpowers in violation of the UN charter, nuclear threats and the imposition of unilateral and illegitimate sanctions have weakened the UN, which at 81 seems overweight, weak and unrepresentative of the world. This makes it an important year for the world to unite in favour of a strengthened and reformed UN while choosing the next UNSG to guide that process over the next decade. This is an important year for South Asia too, with the election of Bangladesh's Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman as the President of the UNGA's 81st session; he will oversee the UNSG's selection. It was disappointing that the world's most powerful leaders and

those at the heart of the conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza and the Persian Gulf failed to suggest solutions for the future. U.S. President Donald Trump spoke about the possible “annihilation” of Iran, and defended U.S. actions in Venezuela. Much to India's chagrin, he again claimed to have negotiated peace in conflicts including the 2025 India-Pakistan four-day war. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian referred to the U.S. and Israel as “murderers, terrorists and assassins”. The Russian President skipped the session, while the U.S. denied visas to the Palestinian delegation. An initiative led by the European Union and a few other countries, co-sponsored by India, to build a Partnership for Multilateralism (P4M) beyond superpower hegemony is well-meaning, but was drowned out by the rancour at this year's UNGA.

For India, this year was significant as the Narendra Modi government launched a campaign for a second two-year non-permanent term in the UN Security Council in 2028-29. It was therefore surprising that Mr. Modi decided to skip the UNGA speech this year, and the multilateral summits on the side-lines, fresh from his hosting of the Delhi BRICS Summit. India's voice, of a balancing power that speaks for a rules-based international order based on the UN Charter, diplomacy and dialogue, is needed more than ever amidst the global warmongering.

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VALUE ADDITION — CHOOSING THE NEXT UN CHIEF

Article 97, UN Charter: The Secretary-General is appointed by the **General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council** (P5 veto applies). The five-year term comes from a 1946 GA resolution, not the Charter; one renewal is customary.

António Guterres (Portugal) is the **ninth** Secretary-General, in office since 1 January 2017; his second term ends on 31 December 2026.

UNSC reform camps: G4 (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan); Uniting for Consensus (Italy, Pakistan and others) opposing new permanent seats; the African Common Position (Ezulwini Consensus); L.69 group. Talks run through the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) since 2009.

India on the Council: Eight terms as a non-permanent member, most recently 2021-22. Recent reform tracks: Pact for the Future (2024) and the UN80 Initiative (2025).

PRELIMS POINTERS ▶ UNGA-81 President: Khalilur Rahman ▶ Guterres: 9th UNSG

▶ UN Charter signed 26 June 1945 ▶ UN Day: 24 October ▶ 193 member states

SYLLABUS LINK · GS 2 — Important international institutions, their structure and mandate; India's interests in global governance.



Practice Zone

MAINS ANSWER WRITING · PRELIMS MCQs · REVISION

MAINS PRACTICE

Q1 · GS 2 / GS 3 · 15 Marks · 250 Words

“AFSPA has outlived its utility in some regions, yet remains indispensable in others.” In the light of its recent extension in Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh, critically examine the continuation of AFSPA in the North-East.

“AFSPA कुछ क्षेत्रों में अपनी उपयोगिता खो चुका है, फिर भी अन्य क्षेत्रों में अपरिहार्य बना हुआ है।” मणिपुर, नागालैंड और अरुणाचल प्रदेश में हाल ही में इसके विस्तार के आलोक में पूर्वोत्तर में AFSPA को जारी रखने का आलोचनात्मक परीक्षण कीजिए। (15 अंक, 250 शब्द)

APPROACH

- **Intro:** Define AFSPA, 1958 (Sections 3, 4, 6) and cite the six-month extension — Manipur (barring 13 valley police stations), Nagaland, Arunachal.
- **Case for continuation:** active insurgent groups; porous Myanmar border; ethnic violence in Manipur since 2023; legal cover for troops; upheld in *Naga People's Movement* (1997).
- **Case against:** human-rights concerns (Oting 2021), rarely granted prosecution sanction, alienation cycle; Jeevan Reddy Committee and 2nd ARC favoured repeal; successful withdrawal in Tripura and Meghalaya.
- **Way forward:** area-specific, data-driven reviews; time-bound sanction decisions; EEVFAM (2016) accountability; police modernisation; political dialogue.
- **Conclusion:** AFSPA as a calibrated, time-bound instrument — not a permanent substitute for governance.

Q2 · GS 3 · 15 Marks · 250 Words

“India’s nuclear doctrine needs review, not revision.” Discuss in the context of the changing strategic, technological and geopolitical environment.

“भारत के परमाणु सिद्धांत को संशोधन की नहीं, बल्कि समीक्षा की आवश्यकता है।” बदलते सामरिक, तकनीकी और भू-राजनीतिक परिवेश के संदर्भ में चर्चा कीजिए। (15 अंक, 250 शब्द)

APPROACH

- **Intro:** 2003 doctrine — credible minimum deterrence, NFU, massive retaliation, civilian control through the NCA; roots in Pokhran-II and Kargil.
- **Why review:** China–Pakistan collusion and Pakistan’s tactical nukes; AI, cyber, hypersonics and BMD compressing decision time; multipolar Indo-Pacific rivalry.
- **Why not revise:** NFU underpins India’s responsible-power image, NSG/export-control credibility and crisis stability; ambiguity invites miscalculation.
- **What to strengthen:** survivability, SSBN leg of the triad, C2 and cyber resilience, early warning, space-based ISR.
- **Conclusion:** Doctrine as an instrument of statecraft — reaffirm, clarify scope, back it with credible capabilities.

PRELIMS MCQs

Q1. Consider the following statements about Tarang Shakti 2026:

1. It is a multinational air exercise hosted by the Indian Air Force.
 2. Its main venue is Air Force Station Jodhpur.
 3. Mission Pégase is the Indian Air Force’s long-range air-power deployment to Europe.
- Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

- (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 only
(c) 2 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3

Q2. Consider the following pairs (Exercise — Participants/Host):

1. VARUNA — India and France (naval)
 2. Garuda — India and France (air)
 3. Shakti — India and France (army)
 4. Pitch Black — hosted by the United States
- How many of the above pairs are correctly matched?

- (a) Only one (b) Only two
(c) Only three (d) All four

Q3. With reference to the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, consider the following statements:

1. Only the Central Government can declare an area as ‘disturbed’ under Section 3.
 2. Prosecution of armed forces personnel for acts under the Act requires prior sanction of the Central Government.
 3. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Act in the Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights case.
- Which of the statements given above are correct?

- (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 and 3 only
(c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3

Q4. Which one of the following committees recommended the repeal of AFSPA and incorporation of its essential provisions into the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act?

- (a) Justice J.S. Verma Committee
(b) Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy Committee
(c) Sarkaria Commission
(d) Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi Commission

Q5. With reference to High Bandwidth Memory (HBM), consider the following statements:

1. It stacks DRAM dies vertically to achieve very high data bandwidth.
2. It is used chiefly alongside GPUs and AI accelerators.
3. It is a form of non-volatile storage like NAND flash.

Which of the statements given above are correct?

- (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 and 3 only
(c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3

Q6. Consider the following statements regarding lotteries in India:

1. Lotteries organised by the Government of India or a State Government fall under Entry 40 of the Union List.
2. 'Betting and gambling' is an entry in the State List.
3. Taxes on betting and gambling can be levied only by Parliament.

Which of the statements given above are correct?

- (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 and 3 only
(c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3

Q7. The doctrine of 'res extra commercium', often seen in the news, implies that:

- (a) Trade in essential commodities cannot be restricted by States
(b) Certain activities like gambling are not 'trade' protected under Articles 19(1)(g) and 301
(c) Inter-State trade is exempt from all State taxes
(d) Government commercial activities are immune from judicial review

Q8. With reference to India's nuclear doctrine (2003), consider the following statements:

1. Retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
2. India retains the option of nuclear retaliation in the event of a major biological or chemical attack.
3. The Executive Council of the Nuclear Command Authority is chaired by the Prime Minister.

Which of the statements given above are correct?

- (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 and 3 only
(c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3

Q9. India is a member of which of the following export-control regimes?

1. Missile Technology Control Regime
2. Wassenaar Arrangement
3. Australia Group
4. Nuclear Suppliers Group

Select the correct answer using the code given below:

- (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 1, 2 and 3 only
(c) 2, 3 and 4 only (d) 1, 2, 3 and 4

Q10. With reference to the UN Secretary-General, consider the following statements:

1. The Secretary-General is appointed by the Security Council on the recommendation of the General Assembly.
2. The UN Charter fixes the term of the Secretary-General at five years.
3. António Guterres is the ninth Secretary-General of the UN.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

- (a) 1 only (b) 3 only
(c) 1 and 2 only (d) 2 and 3 only

ANSWER KEY & RATIONALE

Q1 — (b) Mission Pégase is the **French** Air and Space Force's long-range air projection exercise (Pégase 26 = 7th edition), not an IAF deployment.

Q2 — (c) Pitch Black is hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force (Darwin); Red Flag is the US-hosted exercise.

Q3 — (b) Section 3 empowers the Governor, UT Administrator **or** the Central Government; the 1972 amendment added the Centre's power.

Q4 — (b) The Jeevan Reddy Committee (2005) — later echoed by the 2nd ARC — called AFSPA a symbol of oppression and recommended repeal.

Q5 — (a) HBM is DRAM — volatile memory. NAND flash is the non-volatile storage in phones and SSDs.

Q6 — (a) Entry 62 of the State List lets State legislatures tax entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling.

Q7 — (b) Evolved in *State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala* (1957); applied to lotteries in *B.R. Enterprises* (1999) and to potable liquor.

Q8 — (a) The Prime Minister chairs the **Political** Council; the Executive Council is chaired by the National Security Adviser.

Q9 — (b) India joined MTCR (2016), Wassenaar (2017) and Australia Group (2018); NSG membership is still blocked.

Q10 — (b) Article 97: appointed by the **GA on the Council's recommendation**; the five-year term comes from a 1946 GA resolution, not the Charter.

QUICK REVISION RECAP

- Tarang Shakti 2026:** IAF-hosted, AFS Jodhpur, 28 Sep–12 Oct; 7 participants, 32 observers; F-35 debut with IAF; France via Mission Pégase 26 (7th edition).
- VARUNA:** 24th edition at Toulon (France); INS Trishul; interactions since 1983, named 2001.
- AFSPA:** Extended 6 months — Manipur (except 13 valley PSs), Nagaland (9 districts + 21 PSs), Arunachal (3 districts + 3 PSs); Sections 3, 4, 6.
- Phone prices:** AI demand for HBM/DRAM squeezes mobile memory; hikes of ₹1,000–5,000; GST 18%; sub-\$200 shipments to fall ~40% by 2030.
- Lotteries:** Entry 40 (List I), Entries 34 & 62 (List II); Lotteries (Regulation) Act 1998; *B.R. Enterprises* (1999); amend Sec 5 + new Sec 4A; Kerala model.
- Nuclear doctrine:** CMD + NFU + massive retaliation (2003); review for China–Pak collusion, tech disruption, multipolarity — without revising core principles.
- UN at 81:** Guterres's last UNGA; President Khalilur Rahman (Bangladesh); P4M co-sponsored by India; India eyes UNSC 2028–29.

PRELIMS TRAP-SETTERS

- Tarang Shakti is hosted by the **IAF**; **Mission Pégase** is France's deployment. Dates differ: exercise 28 Sep–12 Oct; Pégase 26 runs 8 Sep–15 Oct.

- VARUNA's naval interactions date to **1983**, but the name VARUNA came only in **2001**.
- AFSPA 'disturbed area' can be declared by the **Governor, UT Administrator or Centre**; prosecution sanction comes from the **Centre**, not the State.
- Government lotteries: **Union List Entry 40**. Betting and gambling: **State List Entry 34**; its taxation: **Entry 62**.
- NCA: **Political Council — PM; Executive Council — NSA**.
- UNSG is appointed by the **GA on UNSC recommendation**, not the reverse; the five-year term is not in the Charter.
- HBM is **volatile DRAM**, not storage; GST on mobile phones is **18%**, not 12%.

PLACES & PERSONS IN NEWS

Place	Why in News
Jodhpur	Rajasthan; main venue of Tarang Shakti 2026 (Air Force Station Jodhpur).
Toulon	Mediterranean coast of southern France; principal French naval base; venue of VARUNA-24.
Tirap, Changlang, Longding	Arunachal districts bordering Myanmar/Nagaland that remain 'disturbed' under AFSPA.
Imphal	Capital of Manipur; municipal area exempted from AFSPA since 2004.
Person	Why in News
Khalilur Rahman	Bangladesh Foreign Minister; President of the 81st UNGA session.
António Guterres	9th UN Secretary-General (Portugal); UNGA-81 is his final session.
Masoud Pezeshkian	President of Iran; sharp attack on the US and Israel at UNGA-81.
Kailash Lakhyani	Founder chairman, All India Mobile Retailers Association (AIMRA).