



**Life doesn't get easier
or more forgiving,
we get stronger and
more resilient.**

Steve Maraboli

Important Issues of the Day

- **India and Malaysia – Page No. 1, GS 2**
- **Social media ban – Page No. 6, GS 2,4**
- **Question and answer – Page No. 6, GS 2**
- **Messaging power – Page No. 6, GS 3**
- **Myanmar – Page No. 6, GS 2**
- **Mount Aconcagua – Places in News**

India, Malaysia ink pacts to expand strategic ties

The countries sign agreements in key areas, including security and semiconductors; during talks in Kuala Lumpur; Modi and Malaysian PM highlight efforts to promote trade in local currencies

Press Trust of India

KUALA LUMPUR

India and Malaysia on Sunday vowed to expand their ties in the high-priority sectors of trade and investment, defence, energy, advanced manufacturing and semiconductors with Prime Minister Narendra Modi asserting that both sides are committed to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Following his wide-ranging talks with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Mr. Modi reiterated India's position on combating terrorism as he said: "Our message on terrorism is clear; no double standard, no compromise." The two sides inked a total of 11 agreements and documents to expand cooperation in a range of key areas, including a framework pact for deeper engagement in the semiconductor sector.

Mr. Modi, who arrived in Kuala Lumpur on Saturday, and Mr. Ibrahim appreciated efforts to promote the usage of local currencies – the Indian rupee and Malaysian ringgit – for trade settlement.

"We will pave the way



Bidding adieu: Prime Minister Narendra Modi waving to the gathering before his departure from Malaysia on Sunday. PTI/PMO

for economic transformation through strategic trust," Mr. Modi said, describing the India-Malaysia relationship as "special".

During the visit, Mr. Modi also met Malaysia's Indian-origin Ministers, MPs and Senators and interacted with four leading industry leaders of Malaysia.

"We are maritime neighbours. For centuries, our peoples have had deep and cordial ties," he said in his media statement. Mr. Modi also announced India's decision to establish an Indian Consulate General in Malaysia.

In his remarks, Mr. Ibrahim noted India's econom-

ic growth and said his country would benefit immensely if it could secure more ways and opportunities to collaborate with New Delhi.

'Spectacular rise'

"It (India's economic growth) is one spectacular rise in the international eco and trade scene," he said, describing the decision to use local currencies for bilateral trade as "remarkable".

In the talks, Malaysia extended its support for India's permanent membership in a reformed United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Elaborating on engagement in the security domain, Mr. Modi said cooperation in counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and maritime security will be strengthened, adding that both sides will further expand defence ties.

"Along with AI and digital technologies, we will advance partnerships in semiconductors, health, and food security," he said, noting that the discussions at the CEO Forum opened new opportunities for trade and investment.

CONTINUED ON

» PAGE 10



ASIA

CHINA

MYANMAR

LAOS

THAILAND

VIETNAM

CAMBODIA

*SOUTH
CHINA
SEA*

PHILIPPINES

*PACIFIC
OCEAN*

BRUNEI

MALAYSIA


SINGAPORE

INDONESIA

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

EAST TIMOR (TIMOR-LESTE)

*INDIAN
OCEAN*



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- **Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA):** During the Kuala Lumpur Summit in December 2019, Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohamad criticized India's CAA, which provides a pathway to citizenship for non-Muslim refugees from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.
- **Reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir:** Mahathir Mohamad also voiced strong criticism regarding India's reorganization of Jammu and Kashmir, particularly after the revocation of its special status in August 2019.
- **Extradition of Zakir Naik:** India's repeated requests for the extradition of Zakir Naik, wanted on charges of hate speech and money laundering, have been denied by Malaysia, citing insufficient evidence.

- **Exercise Harimau Shakti is a bilateral military exercise between the Indian Army and the Malaysian Army. It focuses on jungle warfare and counter-insurgency operations.**
- **Started in 2012, it reinforces India's Act East Policy and commitment to global peacekeeping frameworks.**
- **Samudra Laksamana (bilateral maritime exercise), and Udara Shakti (bilateral air force exercise).**

Which of the following statements about 'Exercise Mitra Shakti-2023' are correct?

- 1. This was a joint military exercise between India and Bangladesh**
- 2. It commenced in Aundh (Pune).**
- 3. Joint response during counter-terrorism operations was a goal of this operation.**
- 4. Indian Air Force was a part of this exercise.**

Select the answer using the code given below:

- (a) 1, 2 and 3**
- (b) 1, 2 and 4**
- (c) 1, 3 and 4**
- (d) 2, 3 and 4**

A social media ban will not save our children

Page No. 6, GS 2,4

On February 4, 2026, three sisters, aged 12, 14 and 16, ended their lives in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh, leaving behind their family and a country struggling to comprehend the horror. Preliminary police reports suggest it to be a case of screen addiction and parental conflict. Politicians, parents and pundits have united in demanding swift action. The sentiment is understandable. When a child dies, we want someone to blame and, sometimes, something to ban. But beneath the fury lies a dangerous impulse: to solve a complex problem with a blunt instrument that absolves platforms of accountability while stripping young people of their digital rights.

The evidence linking heavy social media use to harm to adolescent mental health is beyond speculation. While a few outliers exist in scholarly literature, many meta-analyses and systematic reviews identify small but consistent associations between heavy social media use and increased anxiety, depressive symptoms, self-harm and body image dissatisfaction among teenagers, particularly girls. While most of these studies have not been conducted in India, they still serve as a note of caution on the effects of social media use.

An approach that will not work in India

The tragedy in Ghaziabad has coincided with a crescendo of government anxiety and regulatory intervention across the globe. Australia has a targeted ban, which many in India now point to as a template. In 2024, Australia passed a law prohibiting anyone under the age of 16 from holding accounts on 10 major platforms, including Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, Snapchat and X, which is enforced through mandatory age verification and backed by fines of up to \$50 million (Australian). The law came into force on December 10, 2025, making Australia the first country to truly pull the plug on under-16 social media accounts.

On February 3, 2026, the Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro Sánchez, announced plans to ban social media for those under 16, vowing to “protect them from the digital Wild West” and to hold executives criminally liable for algorithmic amplification of hate. These are emotionally satisfying responses. They also bear the familiar fingerprints of a moral panic. As Stanley Cohen showed more than 50 years ago, when society fails to solve complex social problems, they are labelled as vilified “folk devils” and met with disproportionate, symbolic crackdowns. For



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A social media ban ignores complex realities when what is needed instead is a healthy media ecology

India to copypaste this approach would be disastrous for four distinct reasons.

First, bans are technically porous and difficult to implement even if outsourced to social media companies themselves. Adolescents are often more digitally literate than the legislators regulating them. As seen in jurisdictions with strict age-gating, bans invariably trigger a mass migration to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) or, worse, push young users from regulated platforms such as Instagram to encrypted, unmoderated corners of the dark web where grooming and extremism thrive unchecked. Some forms of enforcement, if linked to identity verification, may also pose the risk of connecting every social media account with a government ID, creating a mass surveillance framework.

Second, a blanket ban ignores the complexity of adolescent development. As noted by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and some child rights bodies, social media is also a lifeline. For rural adolescents, urban slum dwellers, queer and differently-abled teens seeking peer support, these platforms are often their only window to a community where they feel seen.

Third, this approach suffers from a severe democratic deficit. In India, there is a chronic habit of making policy for young people without ever speaking to them. Have we asked what they would like?

Fourth, and most importantly, a social media ban will certainly calcify the gendered social inequalities that will prevent girls from lower income households, particularly young girls, from using the Internet for their social mobility and charting their future. Data from the National Sample Survey show that only 33.3% of women in India reported having ever used the Internet, compared to 57.1% of men. In patriarchal settings, where female Internet access is already viewed with suspicion, a government mandate to “police” age is likely to result in families just confiscating the device entirely from young girls.

What can be done

What, then, is the alternative? First, the government must abandon its addiction to censorship. It must stop relying on the blunt instrument of bans or centralising every government response within the “notice and takedown” regime of the IT Act, 2000. Instead, it must directly confront the economic power and technical architecture of Big Tech. We urgently need a sophisticated menu of legislative tools that

include a robust digital competition law and legally enforceable “duty of care” obligations towards minors, with provisions for monetary penalties. Crucially, these must be enforced by an independent, expert regulator, not by the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology that lacks expertise and is susceptible to political influence.

Second, India needs serious public funding for surveys and longitudinal research on how social media actually shapes children’s well-being locally, across class, gender, caste and region. Young people must be at the centre of this policy process – from the design of the surveys to being active participants who shape its findings. We have already seen the folly of ignoring them. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, with its poorly designed “consent gating”, will result either in false declarations or exclusion.

The issue of regulation

Finally, we should ask why our moral outrage is uniquely limited to social media? Do not any of these issues exist with Artificial Intelligence (AI) chatbots and its integration with social media platforms? Early research already links higher AI use in creating a “cognitive debt” that leads to weaker critical thinking. Relatedly, young people are already using generative AI tools for emotional and mental health advice. Recent reporting and litigation have highlighted serious child-safety failures in conversational AI systems, including sexualised interactions with minors and alleged links to self-harm and suicide. If the concern is about harm to children, regulation has to be consistent and our failure to consider AI regulation must be considered.

In the end, a ban might offer the comforting illusion of control – a way for our politicians to show they “did something” after the latest tragedy. But the price would be paid by the very young people whose rights and futures are ostensibly being defended. As media scholar Neil Postman, who began his career as a public schoolteacher noted, “I am not pro, or anti, technology. That would be stupid. For that would be like being pro, or anti, food.”

The lesson for us as adults is to provide a healthy media ecology to our children rather than taking social media completely off the table. This is tougher work than a ban. But it requires us to confront our dissonance on the doctrine of tech-driven innovation that is exempt from regulation, where on one day we demonise social media and on another, worship AI.

- **On February 4, 2026, three sisters, aged 12, 14 and 16, ended their lives in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh, leaving behind their family and a country struggling to comprehend the horror. Preliminary police reports suggest it to be a case of screen addiction and parental conflict.**
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- **First, bans are technically porous and difficult to implement even if outsourced to social media companies themselves. Adolescents are often more digitally literate than the legislators regulating them.**
- **Second, a blanket ban ignores the complexity of adolescent development.**
- **Third, this approach suffers from a severe democratic deficit. In India, there is a chronic habit of making policy for young people without ever speaking to them. Have we asked what they would like?**
- **Fourth, and most importantly, a social media ban will certainly calcify the gendered social inequalities that will prevent girls from lower income households, particularly young girls, from using the Internet for their social mobility and charting their future.**

- **Data from the National Sample Survey show that only 33.3% of women in India reported having ever used the Internet, compared to 57.1% of men.**
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- **The lesson for us as adults is to provide a healthy media ecology to our children rather than taking social media completely off the table.**
- **This is tougher work than a ban. But it requires us to confront our dissonance on the doctrine of tech-driven innovation that is exempt from regulation, where on one day we demonise social media and on another, worship AI.**

Mains Question

In recent years, several governments have resorted to banning social media platforms citing concerns related to national security, public order and misinformation. Critically examine the constitutional, democratic and governance implications of social media bans in India.

(150 words / 10 marks)

हाल के वर्षों में अनेक सरकारों ने राष्ट्रीय सुरक्षा, सार्वजनिक व्यवस्था तथा दुष्प्रचार के आधार पर सोशल मीडिया प्लेटफॉर्म पर प्रतिबंध लगाए हैं। भारत में सोशल मीडिया प्रतिबंधों के संवैधानिक, लोकतांत्रिक तथा शासन संबंधी प्रभावों की आलोचनात्मक विवेचना कीजिए।

(150 शब्द / 10 अंक)

Question and answer

Parliament must function as the forum to debate contentious issues

In an unusual departure from established parliamentary convention, the Lok Sabha adopted the motion of thanks to the President's address to Parliament without the Prime Minister's reply to the debate on February 5. The explanation by the Lok Sabha Speaker, Om Birla, for the PM not replying to the discussion on the motion raised more questions than it answered. Mr. Birla said that he had concrete information about Opposition Members of Parliament (MP) planning something "unexpected", obliquely suggesting that they may have caused harm to the PM inside the House. It is bizarre to assume that the Leader of the House – the Prime Minister – avoids speaking in the House fearing harm from fellow MPs. Developments in the House, earlier and outside, provide a more plausible reason for the PM not showing up in the Lok Sabha. The Leader of the Opposition (LoP) in the Lok Sabha, Rahul Gandhi, during his speech on the discussion on the motion of thanks, sought to cite excerpts from a book by former Chief of the Army Staff, General M.M. Naravane, which was disallowed by the Chair. On the one hand, the LoP was not allowed to speak and, on the other, the PM chose not to speak. Both are against parliamentary norms and, more than that, a disturbing erosion of democratic accountability.

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The debate and reply function as a mechanism through which the executive is held accountable to Parliament. Mr. Birla stated that he had requested the PM not to come to the House because there were credible inputs about a possible disruption or an "unforeseen" situation near the PM's seat. As Congress MP K.C. Venugopal has pointed out in a letter to the PM, parliamentary rules require that a debate on the motion of thanks must conclude with the PM's reply, and if the House wishes to close the discussion without the PM's reply, a specific resolution must be moved and adopted. Whether or not the book in question was published, as long as Mr. Gandhi was willing to authenticate its contents and place it before the Chair, he should have been allowed to speak. The book in question raises serious issues related to national security, and to deny elected members the opportunity to discuss these is indefensible. The portions that Mr. Gandhi cited outside the House, if accurate, point to the tendency of the political executive to evade critical decision-making by passing the buck and then avoiding accountability. A thorough parliamentary discussion concluding with the PM's reply would have been the opportunity to prove that charge wrong. By skipping the reply, PM Narendra Modi proved his critics right.

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We adopted parliamentary democracy based on the British model, but how does our model differ from that model?

- 1. As regards legislation, the British Parliament is supreme or sovereign but in India, the power of the Parliament to legislate is limited.**
- 2. In India, matters related to the constitutionality of the Amendment of an Act of the Parliament are referred to the Constitution Bench by the Supreme Court.**

Select the correct answer using the code given below.

- (a) 1 only**
- (b) 2 only**
- (c) Both 1 and 2**
- (d) Neither 1 nor 2**

A Parliamentary System of Government is one in which

- (a) all political parties in the Parliament are represented in the Government**
- (b) the Government is responsible to the Parliament and can be removed by it**
- (c) the Government is elected by the people and can be removed by them**
- (d) the Government is chosen by the Parliament but cannot be removed by it before completion of a fixed term**

Mains Question

“Parliamentary proceedings are essential for ensuring accountability of the executive to the legislature.” Examine the significance of parliamentary proceedings in strengthening India’s democratic framework.

(150 words / 10 marks)

“संसदीय कार्यवाहियाँ विधायिका के प्रति कार्यपालिका की जवाबदेही सुनिश्चित करने में महत्वपूर्ण भूमिका निभाती हैं।” भारत के लोकतांत्रिक ढाँचे को सुदृढ़ करने में संसदीय कार्यवाहियों के महत्व की विवेचना कीजिए।

(150 शब्द / 10 अंक)

Messaging power

The data sharing policies of WhatsApp must be scrutinised thoroughly

The Supreme Court of India, last week, sharply questioned Meta Platforms LLC and its messaging platform WhatsApp, in an appeal rooted in updates it made in 2021 around user data sharing with other Meta services such as Instagram and Facebook. The Court underscored the power that WhatsApp holds in India's messaging ecosystem: it is practically impossible to reach everyone with a smartphone, coordinate groups, and undertake business communications without being on WhatsApp. The app's "network effect" has captured nearly every smartphone in the country. The precise background of the litigation that reached the Court is an appeal against a ₹213.14 crore penalty issued by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) for abruptly amending its privacy policy, allowing the firm to share user data across its sister concerns, Facebook and Instagram. Users were prompted at that time to accept the terms or cease using the service. This ultimatum was problematic, and understandably drew pushback from civil society, the government, and the CCI.

Nobody argues that WhatsApp must not earn money for a service that has been transformative for communications in India. Owing to its parent's massive scale of operations, WhatsApp has been able to offer messaging, multimedia sharing, telephony – services that were until 2016 prohibitively priced by telecom operators – for free, with only an Internet connection and a phone number as a pre-requisite. WhatsApp's enthusiastic adoption of end-to-end encryption also furthered a societal expectation for secure communications as a norm, in a country where telecommunications has always been subjected to excessive executive-led surveillance. What is equally true is that WhatsApp is so deeply embedded in Indian society that its transition to an advertising model, where it would start making money here, deserves the highest scrutiny. Competition regulators, including in India, have frowned upon ubiquitous platforms that present users with ultimatums that they can scarcely refuse. There are free alternatives to WhatsApp that work just as well – Signal, Telegram and even Arattai from Zoho are serviceable – but they lack what makes the Meta product so valuable: the guarantee that virtually everyone one knows is on it. Allowing users to "opt out" of data sharing is an inappropriate remedy for services at WhatsApp's scale, because the power of the default option at that scale leaves far too many with no real, informed choice in the matter. The Court's thoughts on this matter are correct, but they need to be supported by a digital competition law, a draft of which was released in 2024, but has seen little progress since. As India approaches a billion Internet users, that law is needed to protect and foster a healthy digital marketplace.

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- **As India approaches a billion Internet users, that law is needed to protect and foster a healthy digital marketplace.**

Which of the following adopted a law on data protection and privacy for its citizens known as 'General Data Protection Regulation' in April 2016 and started implementation of it from 25th May, 2018?

(a) Australia

(b) Canada

(c) The European Union

(d) The United States of America

Myanmar's military-scripted polls, India's strategic bind

Page No. 6, GS 2

Five years after the February 1, 2021 coup, Myanmar's military sought to manufacture political normalcy through elections held in three phases between late December 2025 and January 2026. Predictably, the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won. The outcome was barely a surprise since voting was permitted in only 265 of the country's 330 townships, with a controlled political participation.

Polling was largely confined to urban wards, as most rural areas remain under resistance influence. The junta claimed an overall voter turnout of around 55% – roughly 13.14 million of 24 million eligible voters. This sharp decline, from the roughly 70% turnout recorded in 2015 and 2020, reflects not voter apathy, but widespread rejection of a military-scripted political exercise.

The credibility deficit was compounded by the junta-appointed Union Election Commission dissolving several opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), the Arakan National Party, and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, with senior leaders jailed. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing fielded dozens of serving and retired military figures under the USDP banner, which has now claimed sweeping victories. The new Parliament is slated to be formed within two months.

Elections amidst war; India's response

Since the coup, at least 7,738 people, including activists, journalists, and civilians, have been killed, while over 30,000 have been arrested. Of these, 22,767 remain in detention, including NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and former president U Win Myint, and 11,497 have been sentenced, often on politically motivated charges. More than 1,13,000 houses and structures have been destroyed, particularly in Sagaing and Magway.

The regime's brutality has fuelled the growth of resistance groups, notably the People's Defence Forces, which now operate alongside long-established ethnic armed organisations and control large swathes of territory, including 91 towns.

Despite the elections, these groups exert significant influence, constraining the USDP and



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is Associate Fellow, Neighbourhood Studies, Observer Research Foundation

India will have to manage its ties with the regime, balancing principles with pragmatism

suggesting that the conflict is likely to intensify.

For India, Myanmar is both a strategic neighbour and a gateway to Southeast Asia, crucial for its Act East Policy. The elections, therefore, continue to pose a long-standing dilemma for New Delhi's security and connectivity interests, without legitimising a deeply contested political mechanism.

In repeated statements in December 2025 and January 2026, External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal has reiterated that India supports Myanmar's democratic transition and that any electoral process must be free, fair and inclusive, with the participation of all political stakeholders. This carefully calibrated language reflects India's attempt to uphold democratic principles while avoiding a complete diplomatic rupture with Naypyitaw. During the same period, New Delhi also clarified that any Indians who had visited Myanmar during the election process had done so in their personal capacity, signalling a distance and absence from the political exercise.

High-level engagement has continued alongside this calibrated rhetoric. On the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in August 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to review bilateral ties and explore avenues for cooperation. While reiterating India's readiness to support Myanmar's developmental needs, the Prime Minister also emphasised the importance of conducting free, fair, and inclusive elections involving all stakeholders. The message was clear: engagement would continue, but without explicit political endorsement.

Amidst this, India has continued to play its humanitarian role by sending relief teams, humanitarian and medical assistance, and the establishment of a temporary field hospital under Operation Brahma during the March 2025 earthquake, which allowed New Delhi to remain engaged while avoiding legitimisation of the regime.

Implications for India

Myanmar shares a 1,643-kilometre border with four of India's northeastern States, making instability across the frontier inseparable from

India's internal security. Violence and state collapse have already triggered refugee inflows into the nation. India currently hosts 90,100 displaced Myanmar nationals in Mizoram and Manipur. The absence of a coherent national refugee policy places disproportionate burdens on State governments, thus exposing faultlines in this respect. Continued post-election instability is likely to sustain such movements.


Indian-backed projects, including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, have faced repeated delays due to insecurity in conflict-affected regions. The junta's claims of post-election normalisation will be difficult to translate into improved implementation conditions, forcing New Delhi to reassess timelines, risk exposure and engagement strategies.

Moreover, transnational security threats – for instance, the proliferation of narcotics and human trafficking networks – have accelerated amid weakened border controls and fragmented authority. Of particular concern is the rapid expansion of cyber scam centres and cyber slavery networks operating in border conflict zones in Myanmar, from where 2,165 Indians have been rescued since 2022, but more still remain within the shackles. These developments present emerging non-traditional security challenges, underscoring the need for coordinated and clearer domestic and regional policy responses.

The path for New Delhi

As western and regional blocs such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) refuse to recognise the election outcomes for now, it becomes essential for India to maintain its balanced approach. New Delhi is likely to sustain limited engagement with the regime in power to protect core interests, while simultaneously maintaining contacts with local actors, which it has already been doing in recent times.

Myanmar's elections have, therefore, not marked a turning point. For India, they underline a hard truth: managing relations with a fractured neighbour will require balancing principles with pragmatism – at a time when neither offers an easy exit.



- **Five years after the February 1, 2021 coup, Myanmar's military sought to manufacture political normalcy through elections held in three phases between late December 2025 and January 2026.**
- **Polling was largely confined to urban wards, as most rural areas remain under resistance influence.**
- **The junta claimed an overall voter turnout of around 55% — roughly 13.14 million of 24 million eligible voters.**
- **This sharp decline, from the roughly 70% turnout recorded in 2015 and 2020, reflects not voter apathy, but widespread rejection of a military-scripted political exercise.**
- **Since the coup, at least 7,738 people, including activists, journalists, and civilians, have been killed, while over 30,000 have been arrested.**

- **For India, Myanmar is both a strategic neighbour and a gateway to Southeast Asia, crucial for its Act East Policy.**
- **The elections, therefore, continue to pose a long-standing dilemma for New Delhi's security and connectivity interests, without legitimising a deeply contested political mechanism.**
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- **Myanmar shares a 1,643-kilometre border with four of India's northeastern States, making instability across the frontier inseparable from India's internal security.**
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- **Founded: By signing the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) (1967)**
- **Founding Members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand**
- **Secretariat: Indonesia, Jakarta**
- **Chairmanship: Rotates annually**
- **Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam**
- **East Timor (Timor-Leste) has officially become the 11th member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) after a 14-year wait.**
- **The formal induction took place at a ceremony in Kuala Lumpur, marking ASEAN's first expansion since the 1990s.**

Mains Question

Q. *“Access to safe and clean drinking water is not merely a welfare issue but a foundational requirement for public health, economic productivity, and social equity.”*

In this context, examine the challenges faced by India in ensuring universal access to clean drinking water. Suggest policy and institutional measures to achieve sustainable water security.

(250 Words | 15 Marks)

प्र. *“सुरक्षित एवं स्वच्छ पेयजल तक पहुँच केवल एक कल्याणकारी विषय नहीं, बल्कि सार्वजनिक स्वास्थ्य, आर्थिक उत्पादकता और सामाजिक समानता की आधारशिला है।”*

इस संदर्भ में भारत में सभी के लिए स्वच्छ पेयजल उपलब्ध कराने में आने वाली चुनौतियों का विश्लेषण कीजिए। सतत जल सुरक्षा प्राप्त करने हेतु उपयुक्त नीतिगत एवं संस्थागत उपाय सुझाइए।

(250 शब्द | 15 अंक)

Mount Aconcagua



- **Mount Aconcagua is the highest mountain in South America and the Western Hemisphere, and the tallest peak outside Asia. With an elevation of about 22,831 feet (6,959 m), it is one of the most challenging non-technical climbs among the Seven Summits.**
- **Located in: Argentina**
- **Situated in western Mendoza Province, near the Argentina–Chile border**
- **Part of the Southern Andes mountain range**
- **Volcanic origin, though it is not an active volcano.**
- **Highest point in the Western Hemisphere and Southern Hemisphere.**

Thank You!

