

**“Ability is what you're capable of doing.
Motivation determines what you do.
Attitude determines how well you do it.”**

– Lou Holtz



Important Issues of the Day

- **Section 69 [of BNS] – Page No.5 , GS 2**
- **Judicial removal – Page No. 6, GS 2**
- **Meaningless formality – Page No.6 , GS 2**
- **Lowering the age – Page No. 6, GS 2**
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- **Indira Gandhi Peace Prize – Prelims**
- **Artemis II Mission – Prelims**
- **Rare ant fly species – Prelims**

False marriage promise is not criminal if relationship fails: HC

The Hindu Bureau

BENGALURU

The newly-introduced offence under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, which criminalises sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, including a promise of marriage, punishes deceit, fraud and exploitation, but not disappointment, failed affection or the collapse of a relationship, said the High Court of Karnataka on Wednesday.

“Section 69 [of BNS] criminalises sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means including a promise of marriage, without intention of fulfilment. The provision, though newly introduced, cannot

be interpreted in a manner that allows it to become an instrument of retroactive criminalisation of consensual relationships upon the mere recital of promise,” the court said.

Justice M. Nagaprasanna made these observations while quashing a criminal case against an advocate by a woman accusing him of broken marriage promise after having sexual relationship with her. In her complaint, the woman said that she had initially approached the advocate in a cheque dishonour case, and he had a relationship with her, promising marriage. But, the accused said that the complaint was a concocted story. The court, based on docu-

ments on the past and the present relationship of the complainant and other complaints lodged by her, said that “the complaint bears a strong imprint of manipulation and of an attempt to convert private discord into public prosecution”. “... it becomes difficult to comprehend, far less accept, how the complainant could credibly assert that she consented to sexual relationship on a promise of marriage, when she appears to have been in a subsisting marital relationship or at the very least, in a continuing domestic association, and is also mother of two children, one about 13 years old and the other about four years,” the court observed.

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- **“Section 69 [of BNS] criminalises sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means including a promise of marriage, without intention of fulfilment.**
- **The provision, though newly introduced, cannot be interpreted in a manner that allows it to become an instrument of retroactive criminalisation of consensual relationships upon the mere recital of promise,” the court said.**
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- **Standalone Offence:** Section 69 specifically criminalises sexual intercourse induced by false promises of marriage, a concept not explicitly addressed under the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
- **Definition of the Offence:** The provision penalises deceitful sexual relations where the accused never intended to marry.
- **Punishment:** Offenders under Section 69 can face up to 10 years imprisonment, a fine, or both, but this offence is not classified as rape.
- **Deceitful Means:** The section includes deceitful actions like false marriage or job promises and concealing true identity to induce a sexual relationship.

Judicial removal — tough law with a loophole

Page No. 6, GS 2

There has been much attention on 107 Members of Parliament in the Lok Sabha (the INDIA bloc) having given notice of an impeachment motion in December 2025, seeking the removal of Justice G.R. Swaminathan, Judge of the Madras High Court. The motion had 13 charges against the judge which included one that the judge has been acting against secular constitutional principles and favouring lawyers of a particular community. The notice of the motion was submitted to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Om Birla, on December 9.

The terms and conditions

Impeachment of a judge of the Supreme Court of India is provided for in Articles 124(4) and 124(5) of the Constitution and that of a High Court judge in Articles 217(1)(b) and 218. The term 'impeachment' is not used in the Constitution which instead uses the term 'removal' in the case of judges. The term 'impeachment' is used only in the context of the removal of the President of India from office (Article 61). The procedure laid down in Article 124 for the removal of a Supreme Court judge applies to a High Court judge as well.

Article 124(5) provides that Parliament may make law to regulate the procedure for the investigation of the charges against the judge. Accordingly, Parliament enacted the Judges (Inquiry) Act in 1968 which, together with the Judges Inquiry Rules, deals with the entire procedure for the impeachment of judges.

A judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court can be removed from office on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Misbehaviour has not been specifically defined in the Constitution. But the Court has in a number of judgments explained this term as conduct which brings dishonour to the judiciary, wilful misconduct, corruption, lack of integrity, offence involving moral turpitude, and wilful abuse of judicial office.

There have been very lofty pronouncements by the top court on the ideal conduct of judges. In *K. Veeraswami vs Union Of India And Others* (1991), the Court said that "... the society's demand for honesty in a judge is exacting and absolute. The standards of judicial behaviour both on and off the bench are normally extremely high. For a judge to deviate from such standards of honesty and impartiality is to betray the trust reposed on him. No excuse or no legal relativity can Condon such betrayal."

On the meaning of proven misbehaviour, the Court in *M. Krishna Swami vs Union Of India and Ors.* (1992) says "every act or conduct or even error of judgments or negligent acts by higher judiciary per se does not amount to misbehaviour. Wilful abuse of judicial office, wilful misconduct in the office, corruption, lack



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The operation of a serious constitutional provision for removing an unworthy judge can still be thwarted

of integrity or any other offence involving moral turpitude would be misbehaviour. Misconduct implies actuation of some degree of *mens rea* by the doer."

Procedures of the motion

An analysis of Articles 124(4) and (5), the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and Rules would reveal that lawmakers were extremely careful about protecting the independence of the judiciary. So, the law relating to the removal of a judge of the superior courts was made as tough as possible. The main provisions of Articles 124(4) and (5) are: 'an address to be passed by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of each House and by a majority of not less than two thirds of the members present and voting which shall be sent to the President seeking the removal of the judge who shall thereupon pass an order removing the judge from his office'. It also provides for the enactment of a law by Parliament for regulating the procedure relating to the investigation of charges against the judge and for the presentation of an address to the President seeking his removal.

This Act provides for a motion to be submitted to either the Speaker (Lok Sabha) or the Chairman (Rajya Sabha) signed by Members of either House. The Act requires not less than 100 Members of the Lok Sabha to sign the notice of motion if given to the Speaker and not less than 50 Members of the Rajya Sabha to sign the notice if given to the Chairman. The motion seeks to present an address to the President for the removal of the judge.

The Act in fact introduces a procedure under which the motion given notice is required to be admitted by the Speaker/Chairman in the first place. The Act further says that the Speaker/Chairman may even disallow the motion.

Of course, he will consider materials available to him and may also consult such persons as he thinks fit before admitting or rejecting the motion. The most crucial thing about this procedure is that if the Speaker/Chairman refuses to admit the motion, no further action will be taken in the matter and the motion will lapse.

This procedure needs closer examination. The Act does not mention the conditions of admissibility of the motion, which is the case in respect of all motions and resolutions under the Rules of Procedure of the Houses of Parliament. It may be noted here that the Speaker/Chairman while admitting or disallowing the motion under this Act is not performing the duty as the Presiding Officer of the House. On the contrary, he acts as a statutory authority and thus performs a statutory Act. Still, the basic conditions of admissibility of the motion need to be spelt out. Otherwise, the action of disallowing the motion

may attract the charge of arbitrariness especially when the Speaker is performing a statutory act. It is another matter that since disallowing the motion is a statutory Act, as distinct from a legislative Act performed in the House, it can be challenged in court.

Where the flaw lies

As a matter of fact, the charges against a judge are thoroughly investigated by a committee appointed by the Speaker/Chairman consisting of a judge of the Supreme court, the Chief Justice of a High Court and a distinguished jurist. This action is taken after the motion is admitted by the Speaker/Chairman. This will be a detailed investigation done by very experienced judicial officers. So, what exactly will be the examination which the Speaker/Chairman will do at the first stage? It may be mentioned here that under the law, the preliminary examination by the Speaker/Chairman is of such crucial importance that if the notice of motion signed by as many as 100 or more Members of Parliament is disallowed without assigning any reasons, the whole exercise which is undertaken by Parliament for the impeachment of a judge under a constitutional provision becomes infructuous because the motion does not survive. This points to a serious flaw in the law. Article 124(5) does not refer to any specific motion which is required to be admitted or disallowed by the presiding officer of the House. It may be noted here that under Article 61, there is a provision for a resolution which is mandatorily to be moved. But this Article does not empower the Speaker/Chairman to refuse to admit it on any grounds.

In fact, Article 124(5) which empowers Parliament to make a law to "regulate the procedure for the presentation of an address" and for "investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a judge" does not leave any space for the Speaker/Chairman to refuse admission of the motion. Proof of misbehaviour is to be established through investigation which is to be done by the high-level committee appointed by the Speaker/Chairman.

So, obviously, there is no ground on which a motion signed by as many as 100 Members of Parliament (MP) can be rejected at the threshold.

There is no reason to think that the MPs who move a motion for impeaching a judge will do so without being serious about it. But there is every reason to think that a motion for impeaching a judge is most likely to be disallowed at the threshold if the government does not want it. Thus, the operation of a serious constitutional provision for removing an unworthy judge can be thwarted by the whims of a government.

Therefore, the provision which gives the Speaker/Chairman an option to disallow the motion needs to be revisited.

- **There has been much attention on 107 Members of Parliament in the Lok Sabha (the INDIA bloc) having given notice of an impeachment motion in December 2025, seeking the removal of Justice G.R. Swaminathan, Judge of the Madras High Court.**
- **The motion had 13 charges against the judge which included one that the judge has been acting against secular constitutional principles and favouring lawyers of a particular community.**
- **Impeachment of a judge of the Supreme Court of India is provided for in Articles 124(4) and 124(5) of the Constitution and that of a High Court judge in Articles 217(1)(b) and 218.**
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- **Article 124(5) provides that Parliament may make law to regulate the procedure for the investigation of the charges against the judge.**
- **Accordingly, Parliament enacted the Judges (Inquiry) Act in 1968 which, together with the Judges Inquiry Rules, deals with the entire procedure for the impeachment of judges.**
- **A judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court can be removed from office on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Misbehaviour has not been specifically defined in the Constitution.**

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- **The Act in fact introduces a procedure under which the motion given notice is required to be admitted by the Speaker/Chairman in the first place. The Act further says that the Speaker/Chairman may even disallow the motion.**
- **A three-member committee is set up under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. It includes a Supreme Court judge (or the Chief Justice of India), the Chief Justice of a High Court, and an eminent jurist.**

Which one of the following factors constitutes the best safeguard of liberty in a liberal democracy?

(a) A committed judiciary

(b) Centralization of powers

(c) Elected government

(d) Separation of powers

In India, Judicial Review implies

- (a) the power of the Judiciary to pronounce upon the constitutionality of laws and executive orders.**
- (b) the power of the Judiciary to question the wisdom of the laws enacted by the Legislatures.**
- (c) the power of the Judiciary to review all the legislative enactments before they are assented to by the President.**
- (d) the power of the Judiciary to review its own judgements given earlier in similar or different cases.**

Meaningless formality

The conduct of Governors has undermined their constitutional role

The actions of Tamil Nadu Governor R.N. Ravi and his Kerala counterpart Rajendra Vishwanath Arlekar during their customary Legislative Assembly addresses on January 20 came as no surprise to those who have followed the conduct of Governors in non BJP-ruled States. In Chennai, Mr. Ravi declined to read the speech, which, his office said, had “unsubstantiated claims and misleading statements” to justify his walk out. In the past three years, the Governor has either digressed from the prepared speech or refused to read it out before walking out. In Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan corrected the policy address made by the Governor, who, according to Mr. Vijayan, had skipped portions, as cleared by the Cabinet, and made additions. As long-serving Governors, Mr. Ravi and Mr. Arlekar should be aware that it is a time-honoured constitutional convention for a Governor to read out the exact text of the speech or special address which informs the State of the policies of an elected government. There has never been an incident of the British monarch departing from the official speech; and the Indian system is based on the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. Yet, they have chosen to violate the convention even though they have no option but to function as “mouthpieces”, to quote former President R. Venkataraman, of the State governments. Mr. Ravi’s penchant is to court controversies but Mr. Arlekar did not repeat what he did last year, when he stuck to the script, striking an officially punctilious tone.

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Apparently tired of Mr. Ravi’s repeated violations of the convention, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.K. Stalin has favoured a constitutional amendment to do away with the practice of commencing the first Assembly session of the year with the Governor’s address. Articles 87 and 176 of the Constitution require the President and Governors to make special addresses to Parliament and State legislatures, in the new year. About 35 years ago, President Venkataraman had repeatedly recommended to Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Chandra Shekhar that the practice be deleted through an amendment as he called it a “British anachronism” and a “meaningless formality”. This suggestion should be viewed in line with the thinking of the regime at the Centre, which seems to have taken upon itself the task of repealing “outdated colonial laws”. The language of the two Articles was borrowed from the rules of the House of Commons. Nothing would be lost if the Articles are scrapped, as the President and the Governors still retain their right to address the legislature under Articles 86 and 175. Importantly, Governors should not assume powers and functions that are not envisaged under the Constitution and should set an example of respecting the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

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Consider the following statements regarding constitutional provisions in India:

I. The Constitution of India explicitly mentions situations where the Governor of a State can act in his/her discretion.

II. The President of India can, on his/her own, reserve a Bill passed by a State Legislature for consideration, even without it being forwarded by the Governor of the concerned State.

Which of the above statements is/are correct?

(a) I only

(b) II only

(c) Both I and II

(d) Neither I nor II

Mains Question

Q. Centre–State relations in India are often tested during times of political divergence and fiscal stress. Critically examine the constitutional framework governing Centre–State relations. Suggest measures to strengthen cooperative federalism.

(250 words / 15 marks)

प्रश्न. भारत में केंद्र–राज्य संबंध अक्सर राजनीतिक मतभेद और वित्तीय दबाव के समय परीक्षा में पड़ जाते हैं। केंद्र–राज्य संबंधों से संबंधित संवैधानिक ढांचे की समालोचनात्मक समीक्षा कीजिए। सहकारी संघवाद को सुदृढ़ करने के लिए उपाय सुझाइए।

(250 शब्द / 15 अंक)

Lowering the age of juvenility for crimes is a step back

It has been a decade since the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, or the JJ Act, came into force, altering the juvenile justice landscape by introducing the “transfer system.” A Private Member’s Bill introduced in Parliament in December 2025 has sought to amend the JJ Act by lowering the age threshold from 16 to 14 years for children accused of “heinous” offences. These are offences with a minimum punishment of seven years’ imprisonment or more. If enacted, this will permit 14 to 15 year olds to potentially be exposed to adult criminal trial processes and prison, further eroding principles of care, rehabilitation and reintegration and prioritising retribution.

The problem with the ‘transfer system’

The Indian juvenile justice is premised on the philosophy that children are developmentally different from adults, and are amenable to reform. In response to the Delhi gang rape case (2012), the JJ Act took a punitive turn, introducing the “transfer system,” under which 16 to 18 year olds accused of heinous offences are subjected to a preliminary assessment by the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) to determine whether they should be tried as adults. Their mental capacity and ability to understand consequences of the offence are assessed among other things. If transferred, the children’s courts can try them as an adult or deal with them as a child.

This change was not supported either by empirical evidence or by the Parliamentary Standing Committee that had examined the Bill and found it to be contrary to domestic and international standards on juvenile justice.

Evidence is now emerging that the transfer system is fraught with arbitrariness, procedural complexity and confusion. By requiring assessment of whether a child “knew the consequences” of an act or possessed the “mental capacity” to commit it, the framework shifts attention away from developmental stages and lived circumstances towards an abstract notion of blame. Besides, no tools exist that can



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The Private Member’s Bill has the potential to reshape India’s juvenile justice framework, with implications for fairness and rehabilitation

determine if a child has adult-level capacities to commit a crime, or retrospectively assess their mental capacity at the time of the alleged offence.

Assessments have turned on considerations bearing little relationship to developmental capacity such as whether the child knew that the act was “wrong”, whether they appeared fearful and repentant during arrest, or whether they could describe the possible consequences of their actions.

Similarly placed children are exposed to starkly different outcomes, resulting from personal circumstances, assessment processes, and subjective decisions of JJBs, rather than their actual conduct. No framework, however carefully devised, can resolve the inherent inequality embedded in a process that undermines the rehabilitation objective, creates an artificial classification of children, and results in discriminatory outcomes. Expanding this mechanism to children as young as 14 risks institutionalising arbitrariness at an earlier and more vulnerable stage of childhood.

The reality of adolescent offending

The present Bill also asserts that there has been a noticeable increase in serious crimes committed by 14 to 16 year olds, and reducing the age threshold is necessary to ensure accountability and deterrence.

However, according to National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) statistics, in 2023, 31,365 cases were registered against Children in Conflict with the Law (CICL), which constituted 0.5% of all crimes registered that year. Further, of the 40,036 CICLs apprehended in 2023, 79% (31,610) were between ages 16 to 18 years, with those aged between 12 and 16 constituting the remaining 21% (8,426). The NCRB data thus directly contradicts any claim that younger adolescents, specifically those between 14 to 16 years, are the driving force behind an increase in serious crime. The proposal also reflects a flawed understanding about how children enter the criminal justice system.

Many cases involving adolescents arise from structural vulnerability and inequalities. It bears recalling that many children in conflict with the law are simultaneously children in need of care and protection, whose contact with the justice system reflects unmet welfare obligations rather than inherent criminality. Lowering the age threshold risks drawing these children deeper into punitive processes, without improving the system’s ability to distinguish between culpability and vulnerability.

Exposure to adult criminal processes carries serious consequences for children. Detention interrupts schooling and stunts cognitive development, criminal proceedings generate stigma, and prolonged engagement with the justice system creates lasting psychological strain. The process itself is punitive and traumatising, regardless of the outcome. With evidence that children are still illegally detained in police stations and placed in adult prisons, contrary to statutory safeguards, the problem that needs fixing is the systemic failure and lack of accountability to protect children in conflict with the law.

Fix the system, not the child

The Bill shifts the system decisively toward punishment at an earlier age, and diverts attention from the need for early intervention, strengthening of family, education, mental health support and systemic changes. Legislative attempts at blurring the distinction between adolescence and adulthood undermine foundational child rights principles, including best interests and equality before the law.

If the goal is to respond meaningfully toward serious harm, the answer lies not in withdrawing protection, but in investing in the strengthening of institutions and communities meant to support children before harm occurs. Recasting such systemic failures as justification for the harsher treatment of CICLs does not solve the problem. It merely transfers its consequences onto those who are least equipped to bear them.

- **It has been a decade since the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, or the JJ Act, came into force, altering the juvenile justice landscape by introducing the “transfer system.”**
- **A Private Member’s Bill introduced in Parliament in December 2025 has sought to amend the JJ Act by lowering the age threshold from 16 to 14 years for children accused of “heinous” offences.**
- **These are offences with a minimum punishment of seven years’ imprisonment or more.**
- **If enacted, this will permit 14 to 15 year olds to potentially be exposed to adult criminal trial processes and prison, further eroding principles of care, rehabilitation and reintegration and prioritising retribution.**

- **The Indian juvenile justice is premised on the philosophy that children are developmentally different from adults, and are amenable to reform.**
- **In response to the Delhi gang rape case (2012), the JJ Act took a punitive turn, introducing the “transfer system,” under which 16 to 18 year olds accused of heinous offences are subjected to a preliminary assessment by the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) to determine whether they should be tried as adults.**
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- **The names of 10.56 lakh voters have been deleted on the draft electoral rolls of Assam which were published on Saturday after a house-to-house verification of the voter lists during the special revision exercise conducted by the Election Commission in the State from November 22 to December 20.**
- **Of the voters whose names were deleted, almost 4.79 lakh are dead, over 5.23 lakh have shifted, and 53,619 were found to have duplicate entries.**
- **Hello – Page No. , GS 1**
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Why AI infrastructure matters more

Page No. 7, GS 3

India's artificial intelligence debate is often dominated by applications – automation, productivity tools, chatbots, and efficiency gains. But the Government of India's recent white paper, "Democratising Access to AI Infrastructure", makes a crucial intervention: the future of AI in India will not be decided by algorithms alone, but by who has access to the infrastructure that powers them.

At its core, the paper argues that compute power, datasets, and AI model ecosystems are becoming foundational economic assets. In a world where AI capabilities are increasingly concentrated among a handful of global corporations, access to infrastructure determines who innovates, who governs, and who merely consumes.

For India, this is not a technical issue. It is a question of competitiveness, inclusion, and sovereignty.

A public good

The paper makes a compelling case for treating AI infrastructure as a form of digital public utility. Just as roads enable commerce and electricity enables industry, AI infrastructure enables modern innovation, governance, and research. This infrastructure has two interlinked layers. The first is physical: data centres, GPUs, high-performance computing clusters, and energy systems. The second is digital: datasets, model repositories, governance frameworks, and access protocols.

India today faces a stark imbalance. While it generates nearly 20% of global data, it hosts only around 3% of global data centre capacity. This asymmetry means Indian researchers, start-ups, and public institutions often rely on foreign compute and platforms.

India's policy intent is strong. Initiatives such as the IndiaAI Mission, National Supercomputing Mission, ATRAWAT, and emerging national GPU clusters reflect a



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clear recognition that AI infrastructure must be strategically developed.

Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) plays a central role in this vision. Platforms such as AI Kosh, Bhashini, and TGDEx demonstrate how shared, standards-based systems can democratise access to data and models while ensuring interoperability and accountability.

The risk of concentration

Globally, AI infrastructure is becoming increasingly centralised. A small number of firms control advanced chips, large-scale compute, and frontier models. This concentration creates high entry barriers and amplifies market power.

For India, the risk is not only economic but strategic. Dependence on external AI infrastructure can constrain domestic innovation, weaken bargaining power, and expose sensitive sectors to external vulnerabilities.

The white paper's insistence on sovereign AI infrastructure does not imply isolationism. Rather, it advocates for shared access pathways that allow Indian innovators to compete globally while retaining control over critical systems.

One of the paper's most important contributions is its emphasis on sustainability. As India expands AI capacity, energy efficiency and renewable integration are no longer optional – they are essential. Without careful planning, AI infrastructure could exacerbate environmental stress, particularly in water and power-constrained regions.

The paper rightly calls for energy-efficient architectures, advanced cooling systems, and alignment with India's renewable energy goals.

The scale of AI infrastructure required cannot be delivered by the State alone. The white paper highlights public-private partnerships (PPPs) as a critical lever for expanding regional data

centres, GPU clouds, and sovereign AI capacity.

Well-designed PPPs can combine public oversight with private efficiency – provided governance frameworks are clear, transparent, and aligned with public interest.

AI adoption in India remains uneven. Mature sectors such as finance, e-commerce, and IT have moved faster, while agriculture, healthcare, education, and public services lag behind. Democratised AI infrastructure can help correct this imbalance. Affordable access to compute and datasets can enable precision agriculture, diagnostic tools, language technologies, and citizen-facing public services – especially in regional and vernacular contexts.

This is where India's DPI approach offers a global template: shared infrastructure that enables innovation without privileging only the largest players.

Finally, the white paper underscores that access must be trust-centric. A phased, modular policy approach – grounded in clear governance standards – allows innovation to scale without eroding citizen trust.

Access is destiny

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India has the opportunity to chart a third path – neither laissez-faire concentration nor State monopolisation, but public-good infrastructure enabled by DPI, partnerships, and trust-based governance.

The question is no longer whether India will adopt AI. The real question is whether AI in India will remain the privilege of a few – or become a shared capability that powers inclusive growth, resilient governance, and digital sovereignty.

That choice will be made not in code, but in infrastructure.

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- **At its core, the paper argues that compute power, datasets, and AI model ecosystems are becoming foundational economic assets.**
- **In a world where AI capabilities are increasingly concentrated among a handful of global corporations, access to infrastructure determines who innovates, who governs, and who merely consumes.**
- **For India, this is not a technical issue. It is a question of competitiveness, inclusion, and sovereignty.**

- **The paper makes a compelling case for treating AI infrastructure as a form of digital public utility. Just as roads enable commerce and electricity enables industry, AI infrastructure enables modern innovation, governance, and research.**
- **This infrastructure has two interlinked layers. The first is physical: data centres, GPUs, high-performance computing clusters, and energy systems.**
- **The second is digital: datasets, model repositories, governance frameworks, and access protocols.**
- **India today faces a stark imbalance. While it generates nearly 20% of global data, it hosts only around 3% of global data centre capacity. This asymmetry means Indian researchers, start-ups, and public institutions often rely on foreign compute and platforms.**
- **India's policy intent is strong. Initiatives such as the IndiaAI Mission, National Supercomputing Mission, AIRAWAT, and emerging national GPU clusters reflect a clear recognition that AI infrastructure must be strategically developed.**

- **Globally, AI infrastructure is becoming increasingly centralised. A small number of firms control advanced chips, large-scale compute, and frontier models. This concentration creates high entry barriers and amplifies market power.**
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- **The question is no longer whether India will adopt AI. The real question is whether AI in India will remain the privilege of a few — or become a shared capability that powers inclusive growth, resilient governance, and digital sovereignty.**
- **That choice will be made not in code, but in infrastructure.**

Mains Question

Q. While Artificial Intelligence has the potential to democratise access to services and opportunities, unequal access to AI technologies may widen the digital divide. Critically examine the challenges related to the accessibility of AI in India. Suggest measures to ensure inclusive and equitable AI adoption.

(250 words / 15 marks)

प्रश्न. जहाँ कृत्रिम बुद्धिमत्ता (AI) सेवाओं और अवसरों तक पहुँच को लोकतांत्रिक बना सकती है, वहीं AI तकनीकों तक असमान पहुँच डिजिटल विभाजन को और गहरा कर सकती है। भारत में AI की पहुँच से जुड़ी चुनौतियों का समालोचनात्मक परीक्षण कीजिए। समावेशी और समान AI अपनाने को सुनिश्चित करने हेतु उपाय सुझाइए।

(250 शब्द / 15 अंक)

Mozambican rights activist to get Indira Gandhi Peace Prize

The Hindu Bureau

NEW DELHI

Mozambican rights activist and humanitarian Graca Machel has been selected for the Indira Gandhi Prize for Peace, Disarmament and Development for 2025, the Indira Gandhi Memorial Trust announced on Wednesday.

The decision was taken by an international jury chaired by former National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon.

Ms. Machel was chosen for her “path-breaking work” in the fields of education, health and nutrition, economic empowerment and humanitarian action, carried out under difficult circumstances, the Trust said in a statement.



Graca Machel

The award carries a cash prize of ₹1 crore along with a citation and a trophy.

Describing her as a distinguished African stateswoman and human rights advocate, the trust said Ms. Machel’s life’s work has been rooted in the struggle for self-determination and the protection of vulnerable communities.

- **Mozambican rights activist and humanitarian Graca Machel has been selected for the Indira Gandhi Prize for Peace, Disarmament and Development for 2025, the Indira Gandhi Memorial Trust announced on Wednesday.**
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- **Origin:** Instituted in 1986 by the Indira Gandhi Memorial Trust in memory of India's former Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi.

Aim:

- Honors contributions to peace, disarmament, and development, fostering global harmony, scientific progress, and human betterment.
- **Recipient for 2024:**
- **Michelle Bachelet:** Former Chilean President and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, for championing gender equality, democracy, and human rights globally.
- **Notable Past Recipients:**
- **Mikhail Gorbachev (1987)**
- **UNICEF (1989)**
- **Jimmy Carter (1997)**
- **Angela Merkel (2013)**
- **ISRO (2014)**

Who amongst the following are members of the Jury to select the recipient of 'Gandhi Peace Prize'?

I. The President of India

II. The Prime Minister of India

III. The Chief Justice of India

IV. The Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha

Select the correct answer using the code given below.

(a) II and IV only

(b) I, II and III

(c) II, III and IV

(d) I and III only

Artemis II Mission



- **NASA has set February 6 as the target launch date for Artemis II, its first crewed lunar mission in over five decades.**
- **The mission will send astronauts around the Moon, marking humanity's return to crewed deep-space exploration since Apollo 17 (1972).**
- **Artemis II is NASA's first crewed mission under the Artemis programme, involving a lunar flyby (no landing) to test deep-space systems with astronauts aboard the Orion spacecraft.**
- **NASA – Lead agency**
- **Canadian Space Agency (CSA) – International partner**

- **Validate human-rated deep-space systems in real mission conditions.**
- **Prepare for Artemis III lunar landing and future Mars missions.**
- **Establish a sustained human presence beyond Earth orbit.**
- **Key features of the mission:**
 - **Crewed lunar flyby: Four astronauts will orbit the Moon's far side without landing.**
 - **Free-return trajectory: Uses Earth–Moon gravity to return safely without major propulsion burns.**
 - **Deep-space testing: Full checkout of life support, navigation, communication, radiation protection, and manual piloting.**
 - **Distance milestone: Astronauts will travel over 230,000 miles from Earth, farther than any humans before.**

Two new rare ant fly species discovered



- **Researchers have discovered two new, extremely rare ant fly species from Delhi and the Western Ghats, underscoring the hidden biodiversity of urban forests and biodiversity hotspots.**
- **Ant flies belong to the subfamily Microdontinae (family Syrphidae) and are renowned for myrmecophily—their larvae live inside ant nests and feed on ant brood. This specialised ecology makes them exceptionally rare and hard to detect.**

Metadon ghorpadei

- **Scientific name: Metadon ghorpadei**
- **Discovery site: Northern Ridge Forest, Delhi Ridge (urban, disturbed habitat)**
- **Key features:**
- **Microdontinae ant fly with ant-nest–dependent larval stage (myrmecophily).**
- **Adults are inconspicuous, seldom visit flowers, and stay close to ant colonies.**

Thank You!

